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A. THE SOFTWARE RISK MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE
Over the past thirty years, software has become an increasingly important part of
the technologically advanced weapon systems acquired by the Department of Defense
(DOD). Management of the software development process is extremely challenging and
has become a major source of problems in the system acquisition field [Ref l:p. 1]. These
problems have manifested themselves in a variety of critical weapon systems ranging from
submarines to transport aircraft.
Program offices for software intense weapon systems are facing the difficult task of
managing software development risk. Managing this risk involves identifying, addressing,
and eliminating software risk items before they become either threats to successful opera-
tion or major sources of software rework [Ref. 2:p. 1]. This study will document the proc-
ess of one program office in applying software risk management techniques. Concepts,
strategies, and techniques for software risk management can be captured from this case for
use in future work.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis will examine software risk management in the V-22 aircraft acquisition
program of the Department of the Navy. The specific software risk management
techniques for this program will be identified and examined. These techniques will then be
analyzed for their general application to software management problems during the
acquisition process The overall objective of this thesis is to document the process that will
assist in developing successful strategies for identifying, addressing, and eliminating
software risks.
C. SCOPE
This thesis will focus on software risk management techniques that are being used
by the program office during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (E&MD)
phase of the acquisition process. Technical aspects of the V-22 program may be presented
as they apply to managerial decisions. The central focus will be the challenges facing the
program office from the beginning ofE&MD to the present time. Full-Scale Development
(FSD) issues will be discussed to the extent necessary to explain actions during E&MD.
This research focuses on those computer software configuration items (CSCIs)
that best illustrate the application and results of software risk management techniques. The
avionics and flight control system software are the CSCIs that present the greatest
challenge with respect to software risk management in the E&MD phase.
D. METHODOLOGY
This research is conducted as a case study. A literature review of information
pertaining to software risk management was conducted. This review provided the
necessary background from which to begin the case analysis.
Analysis of the case required gathering information on the V-22 program weapon
system acquisition A specific focus was with regard to software development and
software management of the program for the avionics and flight control system software.
This information was gathered through on site interviews with key Government and
contractor personnel working directly on the V-22 program. Numerous V-22 General
Accounting Office (GAO) reports, DOD Inspector General reports, and pertinent program
documents from the program office were also reviewed.
E. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II establishes the background for the study by discussing the important role
of software in the DOD acquisition process. The chapter also defines risk and risk
management and provides DOD policy guidance on risk management. Software risk
management is defined, and the evolution of software risk management is discussed. The
relationship of software risk management to the DOD acquisition process is described.
Chapter III introduces the V-22 weapon system and briefly details the acquisition
history of the program. The chapter provides an overview of the major CSCIs on the
V-22. It also discusses the transition from FSD to E&MD along with the important role
of independent risk assessment teams (IRATs).
Chapter IV describes the V-22 risk management philosophy and risk management
process for the V-22 weapon system. It then discusses implementation of software risk
management and various factors that have affected the software risk management process.
It also explains key Government and contractor actions with respect to managing software
risks in the E&MD phase of the acquisition process. Chapter IV finishes by providing an
example of risk management
Chapter V provides an analysis of the factors that have had a significant impact on
software risk management in the V-22 program. Lessons learned that can be applied to
other programs will also be identified in this chapter.
Chapter VI will provide the conclusion. It will also provide a set of
recommendations related to the lessons learned identified in Chapter V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
To better understand the need for software risk management it is necessary to first
understand the growing importance of software in DOD weapon systems. This chapter
begins by discussing the important role software plays in DOD weapon systems. Next,
some DOD software development problems will be identified. Risk and risk management
will then be described, as well as the DOD policy and guidance on risk management
Software risk management will then be defined, followed by a discussion on the evolution
of software risk management. Finally, the importance of software risk management to the
DOD acquisition process will be made
B. THE ROLE OF SOFTWARE IN DOD WEAPON SYSTEMS
In 1987, the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Military
Software" described the role of military software in this way:
Software plays a major role in today's weapon systems. The
"smarts" of smart weapons are provided by software. Software is crucial to
intelligence, communications, command, and control. [...jSoftware provides
a major component of U.S. war-fighting capability. [Ref 3]
The use of embedded software provides the ability to change or increase the
functionality and capabilities of a weapon system, often with little or no effect on hardware
characteristics. Software performs many of the critical functions in key weapon systems
that cannot be performed by hardware alone. In essence, our key weapon systems today
are completely dependent upon software to function properly. [Ref l:p. 7]
1. Software Size, Growth, and Complexity
An objective of the U.S. National Defense Strategy is to maintain technological
superiority in weapon systems [Ref 4], The "high-tech" weapons that have evolved under
this strategy during the last three decades have seen an exponential growth in software
costs as a percentage of total computer resources [Ref. 1 pp. 7-8].
The growth in software cost has primarily been a result of the growth in volume
and complexity of software demanded by DOD. As seen by the chart in Figure 1, below,
the growth in software in just the last 10 years has been tremendous.
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5]Figure 1 . Growth In DOD Embedded Computer Market. From Ref.
As weapon systems have become more capable and complex over the years, the
software associated with them has grown dramatically. For example, the F-4 aircraft of the
Vietnam war era had practically no software Today's F-14D aircraft currently relies on
over one million source lines of code (SLOC) to perform its mission. In the near future,
estimates predict that the Advanced Tactical Fighter will require approximately seven
million SLOC to operate. [Ref. 6] This growth represents an increase not only in volume,
but also in software complexity. Complex software costs more to develop and support
after fielding. Similar increases in software volume and complexity are evident in every
category of system that depends upon Mission Critical Computer Resources (MCCR).[Ref.
l:p.9]
The total amount of software demanded by DOD is staggering. A technical report
by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) estimated the DOD demand for Ada language
alone in 1989 was over 40 million lines of code, requiring a rough estimate of over 9,000
person years of programming effort based on moderate code difficulty. [Ref. 7] This work
estimated the number of lines of Ada programming code planned, in full scale development,
and in the post deployment software support stage. Both figures are considered
underestimates. When one considers the other MCCR application programs using
languages other than Ada, the current amount of weapon system software is
astonishing. [Ref. 1: p. 9]
2. Software Costs
Producing this massive amount of weapon system software comes at no small cost
to the Government. While cost data on DOD programs have been poorly tracked in the
past, 1992 estimates of total software expenditures ranged from $24 billion to $32 billion.
This amount was approximately 8-11% of the DOD budget for that year. In the next 15
years it is estimated that software may increase to an annual cost of $50 billion and account
for up to 20% of the DOD budget. [Ref. 8]
The software developmental costs for software intensive systems can result in large
portions of a weapon system program's budget. [Ref. 1] Table 1 provides some examples
of the software developmental cost and its percentage of the total developmental cost of
selected DOD MCCR systems [Ref. 8].













Army LHX Helicopter $115 Million 3%
Navy SSN-21 Submarine $450 Million 13%
Navy Trident II Missile $280 Million 9%
With respect to volume, complexity, and cost, as well as functionality, software is a
critical component in all of DOD's technologically advanced weapon systems. Software
has grown into a multi-billion dollar facet of the defense procurement process and it clearly
plays a critical role in DOD's quest to maintain technological superiority over U.S.
adversaries [Ref. 1].
C. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS IN DOD
As software development has grown more complex throughout the years, so have
the problems associated with its development. Software development problems have been
referred to by some as a "software crisis "[Ref. 9] Air Force General Bernard Randolph
has characterized software as the Achilles heel of weapon system development [Ref. 9].
The Defense Systems Management College's Mission Critical Computer Resources
Management Guide describes the impact of software development problems on military
weapon systems in this way:
Most systems are delivered late, have cost overruns, rarely meet
performance requirements upon initial delivery and are often ridiculously
expensive to maintain. It would be unfair to blame all of these unpleasant
facts just on digital systems and software, but it is generally recognized that
software is a major contributor, and often the only contributor, to these
problems. [Ref 5]
A wide variety of software development problems plague DOD acquisition
programs. There are many reasons why these software development problems have
occurred and have persisted throughout the years.
Some of the more significant problems as outlined in various General Accounting
Office (GAO) reports are listed below:
• Lack of management attention
• Inadequate requirements definition
• Requirements growth
• Integration deficiencies
• Inadequate assessment of contractors' software development and management
capability
• Underestimation of software development risks
• Lack of adherence to software development standards
• Inadequate testing. [Ref 10]
These problems contribute to significant schedule delays, cost increases, and performance
shortfalls. The most disturbing fact about these problems is that they could have been
avoided if proper emphasis had been placed on software risk management.
D. RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Prior to discussing software risk management it is important to understand the
concepts of risk and risk management. Webster defines risk as "the possibility of loss or
injury ." A risk is not a problem. To be technically precise, there are two factors that
comprise a risk: probability or likelihood that it will occur and loss resulting from its
occurrence. [Ref. 1 l:p. 3] The Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) guidebook,
Risk Management Concepts and Guidance, provides an expanded definition of risk as the
probability of an undesirable event occurring and the significance of the consequence of the
occurrence [Ref. 12:p. 3-1]. With risk defined, it is also necessary to understand the term
risk management.
Risk management can be thought of as an umbrella term for the processes used to
manage risk [Ref. 12]. Typical processes of risk management are risk assessment and risk
control with each of these processes involving subsidiary steps [Ref. 2]. The SEI defines
risk management as follows:
Risk management is really an ethic in which you (1) continuously
assess what can go wrong, the likelihood of the event(s) happening, and the
associated consequences should the event(s) occur; and (2) determine
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alternative strategies to deal with the risks, study the impacts of those
strategies, and choose which strategies to implement. [Ref. 13:p. 8]
Before addressing software risk management, some important DOD policy and
guidance on risk management will be identified.
E. DOD GUIDANCE ON RISK MANAGEMENT
In the DOD acquisition process, risk management is required by policy There are
two major directives that provide guidance on risk management. Some of the major policy
statements on risk management in these two directives is addressed next.
1. DOD Directive 5000.1
"Defense Acquisition," DOD Directive 5000.1, establishes a disciplined
management approach for acquiring systems and materiel that satisfies the operational
users needs. The directive addresses risk management by saying that risk management
shall be a major consideration at each milestone beginning with the new start milestone
decision [Ref. 14:p. 1-2]. Program risks and risk management plans shall be explicitly
assessed at each milestone decision point prior to granting approval to proceed into the
next acquisition phase [Ref. 14:p. 1-4].
2. DOD Instruction 5000.2
DOD Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and
Procedures," implements the guidance provided in DOD Directive 5000. 1. Part 5, Section
B, "Risk Management," contains the policies and procedures which establish the basis for
managing risk. This section directs that a risk management program shall be established
for each acquisition program to identify and control performance, cost, and schedule risks.
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The risk management program must include provisions for eliminating these risks or
reducing them to acceptable levels. The instruction points out that industry participation in
risk management is essential to ensure a clear understanding of program objectives,
produce schedule realism, and identify appropriate incentives for contractual agreements.
[Ref 15:p. 5-B-l]
The instruction says the risk management program will consist of planning,
identification, assessment, analysis, and reduction techniques to support sound program
management decisions. Essential characteristics of the risk management program are that
it will:
• Include a structured and documented risk assessment and analysis process, with
user participation, to identify risks early in the program and to provide
proactive, look ahead risk assessment and review.
• Include clearly defined criteria for elements leading to the risk assessment
events.
• Include assessment of the contractor's managerial, development, and manufac-
turing capabilities and processes.
• Identify and track risk drivers, define risk abatement plans, and provide for
continuous risk assessment throughout each acquisition phase to determine how
risks have changed.
• Have clearly defined evaluation criteria for assigning risk ratings of high,
moderate, or low to elements of risk associated with each major subsystem and
the overall system [Ref 15]
Risks, risk reduction measures, and rationale and assumptions made in assigning
risk ratings will be explicitly assessed at each milestone decision point as an integral part of
this effort. [Ref. 15]
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Concerning risk management with respect to computer resources, the instruction
says the management approach, decisions, and plans associated with computer resources
will be documented in the Computer Resources Life Cycle Management Plan (CRLCMP).
The CRLCMP will identify all major computer resource risk areas, to include resources
(people, training, facilities, funding, etc.), support risks, and software safety criticality and
the methods for their control. [Ref 15:p. 6-D-2]
Now that DOD guidance and policy on risk management have been identified, it is
appropriate to look at the discipline of software risk management.
F. SOFTWARE RISK MANAGEMENT
Boehm [Ref. 2:p. 1] defines software risk management as a discipline whose
objectives are to identify, address, and eliminate software risk items before they become
either threats to successful software operation or major sources of software rework.
Software risk management is important primarily because it helps people avoid disasters,
avoid re-work, avoid overkill, and stimulate win-win situations on software projects. [Ref.
2:p. 1]
How and why did software risk management come about? The next section
identifies how and why the discipline of software risk management evolved and what some
of the initiatives are to improve the state of the discipline of software risk management.
G. THE EVOLUTION OF SOFTWARE RISK MANAGEMENT
Software risk management as a discipline is fairly new. A review of the literature
indicates that prior to 1989, there were very few sources of information that described
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software risks or how to deal with them. Capers Jones [Ref 16] estimates that before
1 990, failure to perform adequate risk assessments of software projects had been observed
for 80% of all major (>1000 function point) projects observed. Since that time risk
analysis has started to become more common under the combined impact of new books,
journal articles, and new emphasis on risk management by groups such as the Software
Engineering Institute (SEI) [Ref. 16:p. 254]
The new emphasis on software risk management seems to have been stimulated by
the fact that the software field has had its share of disasters. People are looking for ways
to avoid future problems. Boehm [Ref. 2] points this fact out by saying:
The software field has had its share of disasters. Most post-
mortems of these software disaster projects have indicated that their
problems would have been avoided or strongly reduced if there had been an
explicit early concern with identifying and resolving their high-risk elements.
Frequently these projects were swept along by a tide of optimistic
enthusiasm during their early phases, which caused project managers to miss
some clear signals of high-risk issues that proved to be the project's
downfall later. [Ref. 2]
1. Relationship of Software Risk Management to Risk Management
As mentioned in the previous section, the software field has had its share of failed
projects In the search for ways to avoid these disasters, people turned to the risk
management field for answers. One of the first major works on the discipline of software
risk management was written by Dr. Barry Boehm [Ref. 2]. In the preface to his book,
Software Risk Management, Boehm relates the discipline of risk management to the newly
evolving discipline of software risk management Boehm says, "In the process of
14
researching software risk management as a discipline, I found that it can benefit from a
long tradition of studying risk management in other situations" [Ref. 2: p. v].
Boehm then pointed out that the insurance business is founded on the ability to
assess and deal with risk. Large corporations have risk management departments whose
responsibility is to assess corporate risks and to establish appropriate risk management
programs that involve various kinds of insurance, contract provisions, preventative
measures, policies, and practices to deal cost-effectively with the corporation's risk
exposure. He further points out that dealing with risk is central to the modern discipline
of economics, particularly in such areas as decision theory, utility theory, and game
theory. [Ref 2:p. v]
Boehm' s point was that material from these other disciplines provides software risk
management with some valuable concepts and principles, but that its particular application
to software and project management situations requires a good deal of tailoring [Ref. 2:p.
vi]. At the time Boehm' s work was published, he pointed out that there was no large body
of software risk management literature to date. Given the critical leverage risk
management can have on a project's success, Boehm thought it important to disseminate
the information in his work as soon as possible. [Ref. 2:p. vi] The primary objectives of his
volume were to enable readers to:
• Identify the major sources of risk on a given software project
• Understand the essential concepts and techniques involved in software risk
assessment and risk control
• Apply these concepts and techniques to practical day-to-day software project
situations. [Ref. 2:p vi]
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The effort of Boehm and other authors has added rigor to approaches to software
risk management. In the last five years added impetus to software risk management has
been provided by organizations such as the Software Engineering Institute (SEI).
2. Software Engineering Institute (SEI)
The SEI, located at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is a
federally funded research and development center. Some of the SEI technical areas of
focus are: software risk management, software process improvement, and software
engineering techniques. The SEI has done extensive work in the area of software risk
management on software intensive development programs in the last five years. An SEI
objective in this area was to obtain knowledge in the area of software risk management and
to publish the information periodically. A result of this effort was a series of technical
reports addressing software risk management. An example of one of these reports is
Software Development Risk Management: an SEI Appraisal. [Ref 1 3 ]
The DOD directed the SEI to develop a means whereby the software process
maturity of contractors could be evaluated [Ref. 17:p. 4.15-1]. The objective of this effort
was to better attain management control of software development efforts, as well as
improve production of high quality software. A key result of this effort by the SEI was the
capability maturity model (CMM).
The CMM is a model whereby key process areas have been defined for different
levels of process maturity. The objective of using the model is to assist a developer in
achieving a desired level of process maturity while building a solid foundation of support at
16
each step along the way. The model is divided into five different levels as shown in Table 2
[Ref. 18:Fig. 1.2.1] below. A developer is assessed, evaluated, its strengths and
weaknesses defined, and a program of process maturity improvement is established. [Ref.
17 p 4.15-3]
Table 2. SEI Software Process Maturity Model
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A major advantage which DOD derives from the application of the process maturity
evaluation is the identification of program risks due to poor software quality products or
immature development processes. The application of this process to the source selection
process is called the Software Capability Evaluation process. This process offers the
17
Government an opportunity to minimize risk and uncertainty in software development
when dealing with a particular contractor or development agency This process can also be
applied during the contract as a contract monitoring process. [Ref. 17:p. 4. 15-3]
In addition to its work in the area of software capability evaluations, the SEI
provides a variety of other services in the area of software risk management. Some of the
related products and services are:
• Risk Identification and Analysis Course
• Software Risk Management Course
• SEI Conference on Software Risk
• Independent Risk Assessment (service)
• Software Risk Evaluation (service).
Toward the end of the thesis research process the author had the opportunity to
participate in the execution phase of an SEI software risk evaluation (SRE). Appendix A
provides the reader with some background information on the SRE process. It also
describes the execution phase of the SRE process along with some of the author's
observations
The main purpose of this section has been to identify how and why software risk
management emerged recently as a discipline. A secondary purpose was to show the
relationship of software risk management to the discipline of risk management. The final
item of interest addressed was the recent work the SEI has performed in the area of
18
software risk management. Next, the importance of software risk management to the
DOD acquisition process will be described.
3. Software Risk Management and the DOD Acquisition Process
In the context of the DOD acquisition process, software risk management is
extremely important. As discussed earlier, DOD policy mandates that risk management
will be a part of every acquisition program. Software has become a multi-billion dollar
endeavor for DOD, consuming about 10% of the Defense budget [Ref 8]. The cost along
with the added complexity of software make it imperative that acquisition managers have a
process for averting software problems before they occur.
To many casual observers, it would seem that software risk management would be
an important part of any software intensive weapon system acquisition. However, GAO
reports over the past 20 years describe numerous weapon system programs experiencing
years of delayed fieldings and substantial cost overruns. Potential software risk items were
not effectively identified, addressed, and mitigated or eliminated. One recent case in point
is the C-17 aircraft program. The situation was summed up succinctly in a GAO report:
The Air Force made a number of major mistakes early in the
program that affected its ability to manage and oversee software
development. Air Force officials initially assumed that software
development would be low-risk without performing the type of analysis
necessary to support and document that assumption. [Ref. 19]
The program encountered significant software problems early in development and
was unable to deliver the proper software for the initial test flight.
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The essence of software risk management is to identify, address, and eliminate or
mitigate software risk items before they become threats to successful software operation or
major sources of software rework. To avoid software disasters, DOD acquisition
managers must use the tools of risk management and software risk management. The key
to success is to have a sound risk management program which includes software risk
management. Having a sound risk management program requires a commitment from both
the program office and the contractor(s). There is little documented evidence that sound
software risk management practices have been integrated into the overall acquisition
process for software intensive weapon systems. This thesis will focus on software risk
management techniques being used by the V-22 acquisition program of the Department of
the Navy.
H. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided background for the role that software plays in the
dynamic environment of weapon system acquisition. The cost and complexity of software
development dictate that special attention be paid to potential software risk items.
Software risk management must be integrated into the acquisition management process for
software intensive weapon systems as a way to identify, address, and eliminate or mitigate
potential software risk items.
Next, Chapter III will introduce the V-22 weapon system and briefly detail the
acquisition history of the program. It will also provide an overview of the major computer
software configuration items (CSCIs). The transition from FSD to E&MD will be
20
discussed. Finally, Chapter III will address the important role of independent risk
assessments in the program.
21
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III. THE V-22 WEAPON SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
The V-22 aircraft is being developed to perform various missions. These missions
require the use of sophisticated flight control and avionics systems as well as other
software intensive systems. The chapter will begin by describing the V-22 aircraft along
with a brief history of its development. Next, the major computer software components of
the V-22 will be identified and their functions will be described. The transition from the
Full-Scale Development (FSD) phase to the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(E&MD) phase will be addressed. Finally, the important role of the independent risk
assessment teams (IRATs) along with their findings and recommendations will be
discussed.
B. THE V-22 WEAPON SYSTEM
1. Description
The V-22 will provide the Services with a multi-engine, dual-piloted, self-
deployable, medium lift, vertical takeoff and landing aircraft to perform various missions
[Ref 20]. The V-22 is being developed to perform U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and
U.S. Special Operations Command combat missions for the year 2001 and beyond. The
V-22 design incorporates advanced but mature technology proven in the XV- 15 tiltrotor
demonstrators, V-22 FSD models, and V-22 E&MD models. This technology includes
composite materials, digital fly-by-wire flight controls, and advanced survivability and
crashworthiness systems. [Ref. 21]
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The V-22 will fill multi-service combat operational requirements including
amphibious assault, land assault, medium cargo lift, combat search and rescue, Special
Operations Forces support, and worldwide self-deployability. The aircraft will be capable
of operations from aviation and air capable ships as well as from unimproved landing sites
throughout the world. A tiltrotor combines the speed, range, and fuel efficiency normally
associated with turboprop aircraft with the vertical take-off/landing and hover capabilities
of helicopters. The tiltrotor aircraft represents a major technological breakthrough in
aviation to meet both existing military needs, and through developmental growth, civilian
applications. [Ref 21]
2. Development History
In April 1986, the V-22 program passed Milestone II and entered Phase II, FSD.
In May 1986, the Navy awarded a fixed-price-incentive-firm FSD contract with a ceiling
price of $1,825 million to the team of Bell Helicopter Textron, Incorporated and Boeing
Helicopter Company (Bell-Boeing) to design and produce six aircraft for flight and ground
testing Five of the six aircraft were produced but two crashed and were destroyed. The
sixth aircraft was not fully assembled as a cost savings measure. The FSD contract also
included an option to buy 12 aircraft under pilot production. Also in May 1986, the Navy
awarded a firm-fixed-price contract with a ceiling price of $76 million to develop and
produce engines for the FSD aircraft. [Ref. 22]
In April 1989, citing a lack of affbrdability, the Secretary of Defense deleted all
funding after FY 1989 for the V-22 Program and requested funding for a mix of CH-53
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and H-60 helicopters. However, Congress denied the Secretary's request and continued to
fund the V-22 program. In June 1991, in response to a congressional mandate to obligate
$200 million, the Navy awarded Bell-Boeing an FSD Phase II letter contract for $75
million, which was definitized in May 1992, as a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. In July 1992,
in an effort to resolve the continuing impasse between DOD and Congress, the Secretary of
Defense proposed a solution to congressional leaders that involved developing and
evaluating the V-22 and helicopters as alternatives to the medium-lift replacement
requirement. [Ref 22]
In October 1992, the Navy terminated the FSD contract and awarded a
cost-reimbursable E&MD airframe letter contract to Bell-Boeing for $550 million ($558
million as of March 1994). In December 1992, the Navy awarded an E&MD engine letter
contract to Allison for $65 million, which was definitized in September 1993, as a cost-
plus-incentive-fee contract with a target price of $141 million. In May 1994, the Navy
definitized the E&MD letter contract as a cost-plus-award-fee contract for $2.65
billion. [Ref. 22] The E&MD contract calls for the production of four aircraft. These
aircraft will be used to continue the research, development, test, and evaluation program,
provide aircraft for operational evaluation, and serve to demonstrate the production
facilities for follow-on production contracts. [Ref. 21]
The V-22 Program is currently in the E&MD phase of acquisition. Aircraft number
seven is scheduled to perform first flight in December 1996. Several phases of operational
testing will be conducted using both FSD and E&MD aircraft over approximately the next
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seven years The testing will be conducted to assess the V-22's potential operational
effectiveness and operational suitability. These tests will support a recommendation for
fleet introduction and will also support the milestone III decision for the V-22. [Ref. 21:p.
121]
C. MAJOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE COMPONENTS
As with any new aircraft development, embedded computer software is an
important consideration. The V-22 is no exception. It consists of several major computer
software configuration items (CSCIs). The major CSCIs are the V-22 JVX Applications
and Systems Software (JASS); V-22 JVX Simulation Support Software (JSSS), V-22
Flight Control Computer Operational Flight Program; Display Electronics Unit (DEU)
software; Vibration, Structural Life, and Engine Diagnostics (VSLED) software;
Interface Unit (IU) software; V-22 Maintenance Data Processing System (MDPS)
software; and V-22 Mission Planning Station (VMPS) software [Ref 21]. These CSCIs,
along with some of the associated hardware, are described in detail in Appendix B. A
summary of source lines of code, percent of code reused from FSD, and language for each
major CSCI is presented in Table 3.
D. RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND
INTEGRATION
The prime contractor team consists of Bell Helicopter Textron, Incorporated and
Boeing Defense and Space Group, Helicopter Division (Bell-Boeing) Bell-Boeing is
responsible for all aspects of V-22 development, including software development and
integration [Ref 23]
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Table 3. V-22 Computer Software Configuration Items. From Ref. [23]























































20% C 50K (Note 4)
Note 1
.
NEW - % SLOC that were new development
Note 2. MOD - % SLOC modified from FSD for use in E&MD
Note 3. REUSE - % SLOC reused from FSD without any modification
Note 4 Denotes executable SLOC
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The focus of this research is on the avionics and flight control system software.
V-22 avionics system software is being developed at the Boeing Helicopters (BH) facility.
The digital flight control system software is being developed by Boeing and Martin-
Marietta Control Systems, the flight control system subcontractor.
E. TRANSITION FROM FSD TO E&MD
In October 1992, the Navy terminated the V-22 FSD contract [Ref 22]. Toward
the end of FSD and at the beginning of E&MD, two General Accounting Office (GAO)
reports expressed concern about developmental problems that could make the transition to
production a high risk [Refs. 24 and 25]. A 1990 GAO report referred to a production
readiness review held in early 1 989 by Naval Air Systems Command which identified con-
cerns regarding a lack of software development that is essential for the proper functioning
of the flight control system [Ref. 24 :p. 2]. The report also cited cost growth attributable to
several factors, one of which was the mission computer [Ref. 24:p. 5].
A 1994 GAO report also identified several development issues Among these
issues was a concern with incomplete development of software [Ref. 25: p. 16]. The DOD
response concurred with the findings and stated that the purpose ofE&MD was to correct
the deficiencies noted during FSD [Ref. 25:p. 30].
The V-22 program is presently well into the E&MD acquisition phase, and the
program office acknowledges that the continued development of the V-22 weapon system
is a moderate risk program [Ref. 21 p. 99]. The primary challenges during E&MD from
the perspective of the V-22 program office are: software development and integration,
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weight reduction, affordability, producibility, configuration definition, and schedule concur-
rency. Software development and integration is categorized as a "moderate" risk by the
program office. [Ref. 21 :p. 99]
Software development is considered a moderate risk for several reasons. The
development of the JASS software is a schedule risk for two primary reasons First, the
JASS rewrite effort is relatively large, and staffing in this critical area lagged behind
schedule during the first year of the E&MD contract. Second, Bell-Boeing is converting
from CMS-2 to the Ada programming language for JASS. The flight control system
software development is also a schedule risk area. This assessment is based primarily on
past performance in the development of software for aircraft two and three during
FSD.[Ref 26]
While the GAO reports identified some concerns regarding software development,
more detailed insight on software development was gained from several IRATs which were
chartered by the Program Executive Officer for Air Anti-submarine Warfare, Assault, and
Special Mission Programs (PEO(A)) who has cognizance over the V-22 program.
F. THE INDEPENDENT RISK ASSESSMENT TEAMS (IRATs)
Within seven months of award of the E&MD letter contract to Bell-Boeing in
October 1992, the PEO(A) chartered a V-22 Avionics System IRAT. Since the formation
of the first IRAT in May 1993, three more IRATs have been chartered by the PEO. These
IRATs served the important purpose of providing visibility of software development to the
PEO in the V-22 program.
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1. V-22 Avionics System IRAT of May-June 1993
The objectives of the IRAT were to identify avionics and software related risk
areas, and to provide appropriate recommendations to the program manager [Ref. 21 :p.
101]. The team consisted of approximately eight members distributed as follows: one
from the PEO(A) staff, one from the Naval Air Systems Command staff, one from a
Government field activity, and the rest from a contractor, Mitre Corporation. The team
members had expertise in systems engineering and integration, software engineering,
hardware technologies, and systems acquisition. [Ref. 27:p. 2] A summary of the IRAT
findings is provided below.
• FSD system exhibited much of the required functionality, but the existing
software was a poor foundation for E&MD.
• No show stoppers
1
.
Avionics development was medium risk.
2. Hardware and software were neither large nor complex.
3. There was sufficient time in the schedule.
• Lack of critical skills and sound systems and software engineering processes
were driving the risk high.
• Mitigation strategies existed to hold risk at medium.
• Fundamentals needed prompt attention.
• Indications of inadequate attention to software safety were sufficient to initiate
an independent review. [Ref. 27:p. 4]
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As a result of this IRAT, several recommendations were made for program actions,
Government actions, and contractor actions that would, in the opinion of the team, reduce
the risk in the avionics system development [Ref. 27:p. 5]. These recommendations are
listed below.
• Program Actions
1. Delay transition to Ada and the Advanced Mission Computer (AMC).
After extensive study by the Government and the contractors, a decision
was made in December 1993, to re-write the JASS software using Ada
and to use an upgraded mission computer, the AMC. The IRAT
thought that the contractor was unprepared to make an immediate
transition; therefore they concluded that the lowest risk strategy would
be to continue with the CMS-2 development using the FSD mission
computer, the AN/AYK-14 VHISC Processor Module. The IRAT
thought that the program could hold the risk in the Ada transition to
medium if the contractor developed the necessary capability before
proceeding. Therefore, the IRAT recommended that the program delay
the transition to Ada
2. Charter an independent software safety review. Although the scope and
depth of the review were insufficient to determine whether software
safety problems existed in the Vehicle Management System (VMS), the
IRAT observed deficiencies in the contractor's systems and software
development processes that caused sufficient concern to warrant an
immediate review.
• Government Actions. The IRAT recommended that the Government take
several actions that they believed would reduce risk. The IRAT recommended
that the Government reduce the potential for requirements creep and
disagreements by developing a firm set of requirements and taking control of
the allocated baseline. They also recommended that the Government define
clearly the roles, responsibilities, and authority of the Government integrated
product team (IPT) representatives and focus their participation in critical areas.
The IRAT recommended that the Government add contractual requirements for
normal development milestones (i.e., System Design Review, Software
Specification Review) and associated documentation.
• Contractor actions. As a result of the 1993 review, the IRAT believed that it
was critical that the contractors define, document, and implement a rigorous
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systems engineering and software engineering process. On the basis of their
review the IRAT concluded that the critical skills necessary to develop an
adequate process were missing from the program, and they recommended that
the contractors move quickly to add higher level systems and software
engineering skills [Ref. 27 :p. 5]
Specific action taken on some of the above recommendations will be identified in
Chapter IV where risk management on the V-22 program will be addressed in detail.
The Avionics IRAT recommended that there be an immediate, independent review
of the VMS software and development process to investigate software safety. The IRAT
thought a review was necessary because of the deficiencies they believed they had observed
in the contractor's systems and software development processes. These deficiencies were
sufficient to raise concern over the safety of the VMS software (in E&MD, the term VMS
is a re-designation of the term FCS or flight control system). [Ref. 27:p. 4] As a result of
this recommendation, the V-22 program office requested a further assessment of the Bell-
Boeing (BB) flight control system (FCS) software development. Accordingly, an FCS
Software Development Assessment Team was established in July 1993. [Ref. 28 :p. 11]
2. V-22 Flight Control System Software Development Assessment Team
of June-August 1993
This team was established with the specific charter to review the V-22 flight control
system (FCS) software development and test process to assess its inherent effectiveness
toward safety. The primary objective of the team was to look at the software development
process for the FCS used during FSD, as well as the process proposed for E&MD. The
team consisted of 10 members distributed as follows: one from NASA-Ames Research
Center (Chairman), one from Naval Air Systems Command, four from Government field
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activities, one from the Defense Plant Representative Office (Boeing site), and three from
the software development contractors. The team members had expertise in software
engineering, systems engineering, independent test and evaluation, flight control system
engineering, software safety, and avionics system integration. The team's assessment
focused specifically on process, not on existing software design. [Ref. 28] The major
findings of the team are provided below.
• Systems engineering and software engineering were two FSD activities with
serious shortcomings.
• A major concern was that the early FSD software development effort skipped
over or gave light treatment to the planning and requirements phases and began
directly with design and coding phase. The team pointed out that this approach
leads to problems with traceability of requirements, maintainability of software,
and potentially, system safety. The team further pointed out that requirements
traceability is the cornerstone to successful programs, the heart and soul of
regression testing, and the only reliable foundation for low-cost software
maintenance. The mapping of requirements must propagate to the levels at
which changes are made and tested.
Lack of structured E&MD approaches to systems engineering, software
engineering, and validation testing could not be remedied while the limited staff
was engaged in actual testing, design activities, requirements definition, and
other similar endeavors.
Adequate time needed to be set aside to carefully plan the full range of E&MD
software activities, to acquire experienced as well as new staff, to train the
entire staff in the E&MD (as opposed to FSD) approach, and to incorporate the
various support tools and tracking mechanisms to be employed during the
E&MD software cycle. The team correctly pointed out that that this approach
will save on cost and schedule in the long run. A change in software
downstream is far more costly than properly specifying the software up front,
and such a change adds an element of risk.
During FSD, formalized analysis of the software for potential hazards was not
required. The team pointed out that this is an industry wide problem because
software safety analysis is a relatively new applied discipline. Software safety
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analysis is particularly important to the V-22 aircraft because so many functions
are controlled by software. [Ref. 28: p. 3]
The findings of the team led them to make several recommendations. The first
recommendation identified action that could be taken to contractually bind the contractors
to implement changes The team recommended that the E&MD contract between the
Government and Bell-Boeing (BB) include the following provisions.
• Permit no active design and/or specification of VMS software, targeted for
E&MD aircraft, to proceed prior to Boeing Helicopter (BH) successfully:
1. Establishing solid systems engineering, software development, and
software testing guidelines, including a plan for a core regression testing
approach.
2. Implementing training of VMS staff in E&MD procedures and tech-
niques.
3. Implementing requirements tracing to the individual module and test
case levels.
4 Establishing strict configuration management for validation test cases,
test results, and associated test tracing.
Throughout the E&MD cycle, permit no authorization be made to the
subcontractor (Martin-Marietta (MM)) regarding requirements or change
implementation prior to BH updating all the pertinent requirement documents.
Test facility upgrades
1. Require that BB submit a plan and commit to a closed-loop, pilot-in-
the-loop, flight control computer (FCC)-in-the-loop configuration, free
of data or parameter transmission delays which would require that FCC
software functionality be restricted. This configuration should also
provide for an avionics/VMS interface test capability.
2. Ensure adequate software validation test facilities are available to
support both the V-22 risk reduction flight test activity and E&MD.
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• Include all formal documents used by BH to transmit requirements to MM.
Such documents need not require Government approval. Regular updates to
these documents must be delivered to the Government. [Ref. 28]
In addition to the recommendations relating to contractual provisions, several other
recommendations were made.
• BB should form a V-22 VMS software safety analysis team including
appropriate Government and contractor representatives to: develop and update
a software preliminary hazard list, prioritize the list, assist in determining
potential hazard causes, and oversee the analysis and disposition of these
hazards. Perform a software safety analysis of the latest V-22 FCC software
being flown in the risk reduction aircraft. This action would be necessary in the
interest of ensuring an effective software baseline through E&MD
• BH improve VMS staffing through the following measures:
1. Establish a small dedicated group whose primary responsibility is
support of risk reduction activities.
2. Increase the level of staffing with individuals experienced in modern
systems and software development disciplines.
3. Increase staffing in E&MD through establishment of two-person (as a
minimum), dedicated teams in each of the following areas: software
requirements, control laws, built-in test, redundancy management,
executive/data management, test management, and flight simulation lab/
flight control system integration rig/avionics interface.
• Government and BB permanently establish a review team to monitor, on a
regular basis, the E&MD software development effort. Team members should
include representatives from each contractor, the Navy, and perhaps one or
more outside groups.
• BH implement additional measures to improve communication with MM, to
include a full-time, on-site, technical presence at MM. [Ref. 28]
It is important to point out that the team found no reason to declare the existing
VMS software unsafe, but only that the process used to produce the software during FSD
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might have exposed the product to risk [Ref. 28 :p. 4]. The team also noted that
improvements had been initiated in several areas and should continue [Ref. 28:p. 4].
Specific actions taken by the program office and the contractor with respect to this
assessment will be identified and discussed in Chapter IV where program risk management
is addressed.
In an effort to review progress made since the 1993 Avionics System IRAT, the
PEO chartered another Avionics System IRAT in 1994.
3. V-22 Avionics System IRAT of August 1994
The objectives of the IRAT were to review the avionics development plans and
processes, and to assess the progress made since the 1993 IRAT review. With one
exception, all the team members of this IRAT participated in the Avionics System IRAT of
1 993
.
The main goal of the assessment was to assist the program management team in
planning and managing the program to ensure success. [Ref. 27:p. 3] The team took the
approach of highlighting potential problems and offering general strategies for risk
mitigation and improvement [Ref. 27]. A summary of the findings of the IRAT is provided
below
• Management had taken positive action
• Substantial improvements had been made.
1
.
Processes and structure were maturing.
2. Staffing in critical skill areas improved.
• Development remained manageable.
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1. Task scope had not increased
2. Adequate schedule remained




Monitor avionics software and advanced mission computer development
closely.
2. Continue systems and software process improvements.
3. Continue software safety process development. [Ref. 27:p. 15]
The IRAT pointed out that during the 1993 assessment they felt that the avionics
development represented a medium risk that would become high very quickly without
corrective action Because of the positive action taken they believed that the trend had
been reversed and the situation was improving. [Ref. 27:p. 15] This trend was due in large
part to the V-22 E&MD risk management process which will be discussed in detail in
Chapter IV.
One of the recommendations from this assessment was that the V-22 program
should address the issue of a software safety review of the FSD flight control system
software product. The team pointed out that both the 1993 Avionics System IRAT and the
V-22 Flight Control System Software Development Assessment Team recommended a
review of the product. [Ref. 27:p. 18] Accordingly, a V-22 Digital Flight Control System
(DFCS) Software Product Assessment Team (SPAT) was chartered in October 1994.
37
4. V-22 FSD Digital Flight Control System (DFCS) Software Product
Assessment Team (SPAT) of October-December 1994
The scope of this product assessment was limited to the FSD DFCS software and
its related artifacts. The goal of the assessment was to be able to determine what the risk
level was to the V-22 program relative to the FSD DFCS software and to determine any
necessary corrective actions relative to the DFCS software that the V-22 program should
take to reduce its risk. [Ref 29:p. 3] The team consisted of nine members distributed as
follows: five from Government field activities, one from Naval Air Systems Command,
two from software development contractors, and one from an independent contractor. The
team members had expertise in software engineering, software safety, and flight control
system engineering. [Ref 29]
The SPAT did not validate critical functions of the FSD DFCS software, rather it
evaluated the software's structural integrity and the process compliance of the FSD system
within which safety critical software had been developed [Ref. 29: p. 4].
Although there were many positive areas observed by the SPAT, there were several
areas of concern. Three areas of concern were: testing, software product inconsistencies,
and software configuration management/software quality assurance.
• Testing
1. No evidence of stress testing. The SPAT defined stress testing as
"testing to exercise the error handling and reaction to unanticipated
inputs to the software at all levels" Testing was oriented more towards
verification and validation, vice stress testing to determine if unusual
conditions could cause the software to fail.
2 No evidence of regression analysis Regression testing at MM appeared
to consist primarily of running the unit test for each module that had
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been changed. For modules that had an integration test, the integration
test was also run for the module that was changed. There was no
evidence that a regression analysis was performed to determine if this
level of testing was sufficient, or if other modules may have been
affected indirectly by the change.
3. No evidence of requirements traceability. Requirements were not traced
through to the actual software code. In looking at the source code file
of a particular module, one could not find the requirement (at any level)
for the function performed by that module. As a result, testing for
compliance to requirements is a tedious and difficult task.
4. Limited software integration testing. Software testing using the 1750A
simulator at MM was performed at the unit level only. No integration
(regression) testing of groups of modules was performed using the
simulator
5. Evidence of non-compliance in unit testing. The unit tests for four
modules were examined in detail. For all four modules the tests were
found to be weak and did not satisfy the current documented MM unit
test guidelines. There was no evidence of stress testing.
6. No documented hardware/software integration level test selection
criteria. The process used in FSD for performing regression testing was
not documented; there was no list of hardware/software integration
tests or system level tests that need to be run when a module is changed
(there is a unit test associated with each module) to ascertain whether




Coding conventions. The SPAT identified certain violations of coding
conventions and inconsistencies in internal code documentation. The
SPAT found a large number of potential inconsistencies in the use of
freeze/release comments. The documentation (code comments) of what
registers are modified in a module were sometimes incomplete,
especially when the transitive closure of all called macros and modules
are considered In the source code and the design documentation that
the SPAT reviewed, the conventions for logical values were not
documented.
2. Hierarchical Input Process Output (HIPO) versus code. Seven modules
were examined to ensure that all design requirements in the HIPO were
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implemented in the code. For two of these modules discrepancies were
found between the HIPO and the code.
3. Internal inconsistencies in design documentation and in code. In
addition to inconsistencies between the HIPO and the code,
inconsistencies within a code module or within a HIPO were found.
Numerous cases of erroneous comments were found within the code.
4. Test reports. In trying to retrieve three hardware/software test reports
one of the reports could not be found.
• Software configuration management/software quality assurance. There was a
lack of rigor in some code and unit test review activities. It was found that peer
review for code and unit test did not require the use of formal checklists. In
fact, formal checklists are not required unless more than 50% of the unit
software is changed. [Ref 29]
The recommendations that resulted from the assessment are highly technical in
nature and beyond the scope of this research. However, it is useful to point out that the
SPAT served the important purpose of identifying areas of concern with the FSD DFCS
software. The SPAT also made recommendations to address concern over potential risk
areas with the goal of keeping the DFCS software at the lowest possible risk in terms of
safety [Ref. 29:p. 34]. It is also important to point out that the SPAT found no
deficiencies that would indicate unsafe operation [Ref. 29 :p. 34].
This section has discussed the important role of independent assessments in
identifying software related risk areas. From early 1993 through the end of 1994, these
assessments have provided the cognizant PEO with extremely important insight as to the
status of software development. The assessments have also provided insight on potential
problem areas where action was needed.
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G. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a description of the V-22 weapon system, a system that
will fill multi-service combat operational requirements. A brief history of the development
of the V-22 was detailed. Major software components were identified and their functions
were described. The transition from FSD to E&MD and some concerns relating to
software development were described. Finally, the important role of the IRATs along with
the results of their assessments was provided.
The next chapter will describe the V-22 risk management process. It will also
describe how software risk management is implemented as part of the overall risk
management process. Key Government and contractor actions which have affected
software risk management will be identified and discussed. Also, an example of risk
management will be provided.
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IV. RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE V-22 PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
In order for the risk management process to work, it must become formal,
systematic, and be applied in a disciplined manner [Ref. 12:p. 2-1]. There are no
"cookbook" solutions to risk management [Ref. 30]. Each situation is different and each
circumstance requires a slightly different approach [Ref. 12]. As stated in Chapter II, the
essence of software risk management and risk management in general is to identify,
address, and eliminate or mitigate risk items before they become threats to program
success. One of the major keys to success in program management is having a sound risk
management program which includes software risk management. Having a sound risk
management program requires a commitment from both the program office and the
contractor(s).
This chapter begins by examining the risk management philosophy and risk
management process in the V-22 program. Next, the implementation of software risk
management will be described along with some of the factors that have significantly
impacted the software risk management process. Key Government and contractor actions
taken with respect to software risk management will be identified and discussed. Finally,
an example of an identified risk item will be provided along with the approach that is being
used to track and mitigate the risk involved.
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B. RISK MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY AND PROCESS
The V-22 Program Manager (PM) considers sound risk management to be impera-
tive to the success of the program [Ref. 26: p. D-3], This section will examine the
foundation for the V-22 risk management process as well as the process itself.
1. The V-22 Risk Management Philosophy
V-22 program management sold the E&MD phase of the program as a phase that
would produce production representative aircraft. The PM realized that a significant
amount of funding ($4 billion through fiscal year 1993) had already been devoted to
development in the FSD phase of the program [Ref. 25]. A significant amount of funding
would also be devoted to tooling and other investment for production during the E&MD
phase of the program. This realization was a prime motivating factor for an aggressive risk
management program. [Ref. 31] It is in this environment that the V-22 risk management
philosophy was developed.
The V-22 risk management philosophy is to create an open, honest, risk-aware
culture in which risk management is considered to be a normal, healthy aspect of overall
program management [Ref 32:p. 1]. This management philosophy has aided tremendously
in ensuring that an environment exists where risks are freely communicated throughout the
program management structure. For risk management to work, more than just a
philosophy is required. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the risk management
process must become formal, systematic, and be applied in a disciplined manner to be
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successful [Ref. 12]. The V-22 program has developed just such a process for risk
management.
2. The V-22 Risk Management Process
The need to meet technical performance requirements and perform within program
cost and schedule constraints dictates that risk be managed in a controlled, systematic
manner As the V-22 program entered E&MD, the Deputy Program Manager for
Production (PMA-275D) established a much more formal process for risk management
than the one that was in place during FSD. PMA-275D worked with the contractors to
establish a formal, documented process. [Ref. 31] The risk management process has
evolved substantially during E&MD and is documented as a formal program procedure
[Ref. 32] The formal document provides direction to all program and supporting
organizations regarding the risk management process for the V-22 Osprey program. The
procedure has been fully coordinated between the customer (V-22 program office) and the
contractors, Bell-Boeing (BB) [Ref. 33]
PMA-275D is the V-22 program office focal point for risk management and heads
the V-22 risk management team [Ref. 31]. Team membership is drawn from various
integrated product teams (IPTs) within the Naval Air Systems Command matrix
organization [Ref. 23]. Support contractor personnel, who assist the V-22 program office
in the area of risk management, are also on the team [Ref 30]. The team consists of a core
of approximately 10 members and meets on a weekly basis to update status on outstanding
risks. Attendance at the weekly meetings varies based on the number and nature of
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outstanding risks. [Ref. 30] Including the time spent by PMA-275D, the author estimates
that the team spends approximately 250-300 hours per month on risk management.
The V-22 risk management process consists of risk identification, risk characteriza-
tion/analysis, impact assessment, development of risk reduction plans/mitigation strategies,
implementation of action plans, monitoring progress, and disposition of risk items [Ref.
34]. Each element of the process is briefly discussed below.
• Risk Identification. Risks are primarily identified through the integrated
product team (IPT) process, but can also be identified by customer or
contractor program management. Risks can also be identified through various
other means such as: schedule network analysis, test results, meetings/
discussions, review of IPT minutes, technical compliance matrix, technical
performance measurements, and review of cost, schedule control system data.
[Refs 32 and 34]
• Risk Characterization/Analysis. As potential risks are identified, the items
should be detailed on a potential risk form, which is included as an attachment
to the program procedure. The potential risk is then forwarded to the Bell-
Boeing (BB) program office and subsequently distributed to the customer and
the Risk Management Control Board (RCB) focal points at each site. The
potential risk is then reviewed at the next RCB meeting and a decision is made
as to whether or not the item should be formally tracked as a risk. The review
includes both a qualitative and quantitative assessment. If it is decided that the
item should be tracked as a risk, it is assigned a permanent identification
number, a level, and a category and added to the risk database. [Ref. 32] The
RCB and the risk database will be addressed in more detail later in this section.
• Impact Assessment. Alternatives for reducing the risk are identified and
analyzed A three-fold impact assessment is conducted: impact if no action is
taken; impact based upon most likely course of action; and impact of the
action itself. The impact is documented in the E&MD risk database. [Ref. 34]
• Development of Risk Reduction Plans/Mitigation Strategies. After a risk has
been identified and an identification number assigned by the RCB, a risk
abatement plan must be developed by the responsible IPT. The amount of
detail that is required for a risk abatement plan is dependent upon the level of
the risk assessment. All risk plans are developed, reported, and monitored
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using a common format which is provided as an attachment in the program
procedure Once the abatement plan has been developed, it is presented at the
RCB for final review and approval. Any issues with the plan are resolved at
this time by the RCB. Disapproved plans are either closed or revised based on
RCB inputs. [Ref 32] An example of an actual risk abatement plan is shown in
Appendix C.
• Implementation of Action Plans. Risk abatement plans are authorized for
implementation with RCB approval. The RCB obtains concurrence, if required,
from the V-22 PM, Bell-Boeing PM, or procuring contracting officer. At the
time of plan approval, the risk is assigned a permanent identification number
and the date when the next plan update is required is established. This date is
based upon the planned completion of events in the abatement plan. As a
minimum, status will be provided on the moderate and high plans on a monthly
basis. During this review, management actions will be assigned to address any
issues that must be resolved in order to execute the plan (i.e., provide funding
for an alternate plan, resolve a resource issue, etc.). [Ref. 32]
• Monitoring Progress. All risks are monitored through the IPT process and are
reviewed by the RCB. Additionally, risk status is examined in design reviews,
presented monthly to program management, and reviewed in program manage-
ment reviews. [Ref. 32]
• Disposition of Risk Items Risk items are assessed weekly by the V-22 risk
management team. Items are downgraded or upgraded as appropriate. Risk
items are also categorized as open, closed, or monitor. Closed items are
retained in the risk database. [Ref. 34]
Two important components of the risk management process are the RCB and the
risk database.
The RCB is an integrated management team consisting of representatives from the
customer and BB. It is responsible for overseeing the risk management process for the
program. The board meets every two weeks and consists of a core group of members with
others attending as required based on subject matter. The core group consists of
representatives from the customer and BB. The V-22 PM and the BB Project Officer (PO)
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serve as the board co-chair. A BB representative records the minutes and documents all
decisions made during the meeting. These minutes require Naval Air Systems Command
and BB approval and are distributed within five working days of the meeting. The
meetings are held via face-to-face sessions, video conferences, or teleconferences as the
subject matter warrants. [Ref. 32]
A common risk database is acknowledged by both the customer and BB as the
common source of detailed risk data for the program. This database is maintained by the
Government through a coordinated effort with BB, the customer, associate contractors,
and other Government agencies. [Ref. 32] An excerpt from the V-22 E&MD risk database
is shown in Table 4.
As part of the formally documented process, roles and responsibilities for risk




Identify and categorize risks.
2. Prepare abbreviated risk plans.
3. Prepare risk abatement plans for high and moderate risks.
4. Identify resource/funding requirements for risk abatement.
5. Implement and provide status on risk abatement plans following ap-
proval by program management.
6. Review risk status as part of the weekly IPT agenda and provide status
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Task the IPTs with identifying risks and developing risk abatement plans
for risks which are generated internally and risks which are flowed from
the customer through the RCB.
2. Review all risk abatement plans submitted by the IPTs.
3
.
Review any additional IPT resource/funding requirements for risk abate-
ment, identify the source, and provide approval as required.
4 Review risk status with program management and receive approval from
program management for resource/funding, as required.




Serve as the Bell-Boeing focal point for risk management and co-chair
of the RCB
2. Develop and maintain a procedure for the risk management process.
3. Maintain the V-22 risk list for the program.
4. Keep the customer abreast of changes to the risk abatement plans.
5. Develop agenda and distribute materials for the RCB meeting.
6. Publish RCB meeting minutes within five working days of the
meeting. [Ref. 32]
Risk Management Control Board
1
.
Provide direction and guidance for the risk management process for the
V-22 E&MD program
2. Develop appropriate metrics for tracking and reporting the status of risk
activity. [Ref. 32]
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The IPTs and AITs play an important role in the risk management process for the
V-22 program. Appendix D further describes the structure and roles of the AITs and IPTs.
3. Program Manager (PM) Use of Risk Management Information
The V-22 PM relies heavily on the risk manager, PMA-275D, and the RCB to
manage V-22 program risks. The PM receives risk information on an exception basis. [Ref
35] The V-22 risk manager and RCB mutually determine which risks are identified to the
PM. Status is provided to the PM on high and moderate risks on a monthly basis. Also,
the V-22 risk manager provides weekly updates on high risk items. The PM uses this risk
information to make management decisions such as re-allocation of resources or schedule
adjustments. [Ref. 35]
The risk management process has helped eliminate monthly and quarterly major
program reviews. At major program reviews, which occur every six months, top risk items
are discussed. Also, the PEO is briefed quarterly by the PM and top program risks are
communicated at this briefing. [Ref. 35]
This section has examined the V-22 risk management process. The program risk
management philosophy was described as a foundation for the structured, documented risk
management process. The actual risk management process was also discussed. Finally,
PM use of risk management information was discussed. The V-22 risk management
process can be viewed as a fully integrated process with extensive contractor involvement
and clearly defined roles and responsibilities.
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As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, software risk management is
considered as part of the overall risk management program. The next section explains how
software risk management is implemented within the V-22 program structure. It also
describes some of the factors that have affected the software risk management process.
C. SOFTWARE RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE V-22 PROGRAM
In the V-22 program the software risk management process is fully integrated into
the overall risk management process. This section will explain how the software risk
management process is implemented within the V-22 program structure using the AIT and
IPT
There have been several factors which have affected software risk management in
the V-22 program. These factors are listed below and will also be discussed in this section.




1. Implementation of Software Risk Management
Appendix D explains in general terms what the AITs and IPTs are and how they
operate. The V-22 risk management process flows responsibility for risk identification,
tracking, and mitigation to the AITs and IPTs.
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One of the key AITs in the software risk management process is the Avionics AIT.
The V-22 procedure on risk management is implemented for the JASS software CSCI in
the Avionics AIT by:
• Identifying and tracking risk items with risk reduction profiles. An example of a
risk reduction profile is provided in Appendix E.
• Flowing risk management requirements to the IPTs and subcontractors.
• Elevating appropriate risks to the Air Vehicle AIT [Ref 36]
As depicted in Figure 2, the Operational Software IPT is one of seven IPTs under
the Avionics AIT. The Avionics Operational Software IPT has implemented risk
management by:
• Documenting risk management in section 3.3 of the Software Development
Plan.
• Identifying Avionics Operational Software IPT action items in weekly meetings
with the Avionics AIT.
• Elevating appropriate risk items to the Avionics ATT [Ref 36]
The IPT/AIT process for software risk management on the other CSCIs in the
V-22 weapon system is similar to that of the JASS CSCI described above. A benefit of
IPTs in software risk management is that there is Government membership and
participation in each IPT. Having a Government representative on each IPT facilitates the
early identification of risks. Government representatives participate in all IPT meetings.
Therefore, when risks are surfaced in IPT meetings the Government has immediate
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Figure 2. Avionics Integrated Product Teams. From [Ref. 38]
2. Use of Software Metrics as a Risk Management Tool
At the beginning of the E&MD phase, software metrics were recognized as being
essential management indicators necessary to track software development. In the V-22
program a variety of software metrics are submitted by the contractors to the program
office These metrics are analyzed by program office engineering personnel to determine
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the status of software development. The metrics are used not only to determine past and
current performance but are also used to predict future performance. The metrics, when
properly used, can be good predictors of future problems, thus making software metrics an
important risk identification tool.
Metrics are contractually required and are submitted by the contractor on a
quarterly basis in the Software Development Status Report (SDSR). The SDSR presents a
series of graphs and charts that provide a top level summary of the software development
effort. Some of the metrics provided are: memory resource utilization, processing time
utilization, software designed, software coded, software units tested, and closed problem/
change reports. [Ref. 23] This list is not all inclusive but is representative of the type of
metrics collected.
During the E&MD phase, the need for additional metrics was identified. As a
result, metrics were developed using a prime contractor engineering operating instruction
(EOI). The EOI provides instructions for a consistent and uniform approach for the
collection of metrics. The framework for software status is the avionics stop light chart
shown in Figure 3. The chart serves as a composite graphic for metric indicators. The
stop light chart is supported by lower level metrics. For example, the product factor is a
cumulative rating that is substantiated by the following indicators: software size,
requirements growth, requirements definition and stability, and incremental release content.
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The stop light charts are not contractually required but are delivered on a monthly
basis for evaluation. [Ref. 23] These charts provide a summary of past performance as well
as a forecast of future performance. Assessment of metric indicators is a primary tool for
software risk management in the V-22 program. [Ref. 39]
3. Management Attention
From the early stages of the E&MD phase, management attention has clearly been
focused on software development as a risk to the V-22 program. Upper level management
attention came mainly from the PEO and PM level. [Refs. 27, 28, 29, and 31]
Due to program performance in FSD [Refs. 24 and 25], the PEO with cognizance
over the V-22 program felt that it was necessary to gain detailed insight on the outlook for
software development early in the E&MD phase. As a result the IRATs discussed in
Chapter III were conducted The IRATs were chartered to identify avionics and flight
control system software related risk areas, and to provide appropriate recommendations to
the V-22 PM. These assessments highlighted potential problem areas relative to software
development and integration, systems engineering, software engineering, documentation,
and manpower. Key actions taken by both the Government and contractors with respect to
the software risks identified will be addressed later in this section.
In addition to management attention at the PEO level, attention to software
development has also been focused at the PM level. In the V-22 program, the PM has
realized that software development is typically not well understood by program managers.
Therefore, the management philosophy is that software should always be monitored closely
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and considered at least a moderate risk. [Ref. 31] A by-product of the fact that software is
not well understood at the program manager level is the fact that someone must be found
who is "smart' 1 (technically competent) in software to manage software development for
the program office [Ref 31].
4. Personnel Experience/Competence
A necessary ingredient to the success of the V-22 program or any other software
intensive program is to find someone who is competent in the area of software to manage
the aspects of development related to software. [Ref. 31] The V-22 program has an
experienced and highly competent Government Avionics Systems Project Engineer (ASPE)
who is responsible for development of avionics software and hardware for the
program. [Ref. 31]
The ASPE has 1 5 years of experience in the civilian sector in jobs ranging from
electronics technician up to full engineer status. The ASPE received an undergraduate
degree in computer science with a minor in electrical engineering while working in the
civilian sector. He also has software experience in the civilian sector in the area of
simulation using assembly language and C. Prior to coming to the V-22 program the
ASPE had management level experience with the Government on other avionics
development programs The ASPE's Government education in software is limited to a
systems engineering course completed at DSMC. While a member of the Computer
Resources Division at Naval Air Systems Command, the ASPE attended monthly training
sessions in software related topics such as: managing software changes, metrics, software
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testing, configuration management, and independent validation and verification. The ASPE
now considers himself a hybrid with formal education and work experience in both
hardware and software. [Ref 40]
Program management expressed a high level of confidence in the ASPE to
effectively manage the risks of software development. In addition to confidence in
Government personnel, program management also has a high level of confidence in the
contractor software managers in the areas of avionics and the flight control system. In the
E&MD phase the contractors have taken an aggressive approach to identifying and
addressing software development risks. These managers have developed an effective
strategy, including the use of metrics, for dealing with the risks of software
development. [Ref. 31]
5. Contract Type
The type of contract used during FSD was a fixed-price type contract [Ref. 22].
Due to the fixed-price environment of the FSD effort there was little opportunity for the
Government to significantly influence or oversee the software development process. This
environment may have been good for expediting first flight, but resulted in shortfalls in
several areas related to software development such as systems engineering and validation
testing. [Ref 28]
In May 1994, the E&MD contract was definitized as a cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF)
contract [Ref. 22]. This type of contract gives the V-22 program the flexibility to provide
incentives in certain areas where additional emphasis is desired from the contractor.
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Because the V-22 Program Manager considers risk management to be imperative to the
success of the program, the V-22 team has designated risk management as a major award
fee criterion during the E&MD effort. [Ref 26] This approach gives the contractor an
incentive to demonstrate an active risk management program that identifies areas of risk
and provides for corrective action.
D. KEY GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
As the V-22 program entered the E&MD phase, the PEO with cognizance over the
program chartered several IRATs to identify software related risk areas and provide
appropriate recommendations to the PM. These recommendations were identified in
Chapter III. As a result of these recommendations the Government took several actions
that would reduce the risk in software development during the E&MD phase. This section
will discuss some of the key actions taken by the Government in response to those
recommendations.
1. Transition to Ada and the Advanced Mission Computer (AMC)
In FSD, the JASS software CSCI was developed using the CMS-2 computer lan-
guage. After extensive research and study by the Government and the contractors, a deci-
sion was made in December 1993, to re-write JASS using Ada [Ref. 21]. The JASS CSCI
will be embedded in the AN/AYK-14(V) AMC [Ref 21]. The AMC is a new item being
developed as a spin-off from the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) inte-
grated mission processor [Ref. 23].
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The change that concerned the 1993 Avionics IRAT the most was the proposed
switch to Ada and the AMC for JASS. The IRAT thought that the contractor was not
prepared to execute an Ada development because of a lack of staff experienced in Ada
software development and the immaturity of their software development process. The
IRAT recommended that the program delay the transition to Ada and continue with the
CMS-2 development to reduce the risk in meeting the first flight milestone. [Ref 27]
Because of the cost implications and other difficulties in maintaining parallel CMS-
2 and Ada developments, the program elected to accept the increased risk and proceeded
directly to the Ada system [Ref. 27].
The V-22 program took aggressive action to reduce the risk associated with the
transition to Ada/AMC. A V-22 risk mitigation strategy for the transition from CMS-2 to
Ada has been developed and followed. [Ref. 27] The risk associated with JASS
development is being reduced through close monitoring of carefully selected software
metrics, including manpower considerations and Government participation in the software
IPTs. Also, a number of periodic in-process reviews have been scheduled to ensure that
progress in this critical area is satisfactory. [Ref. 26] Contractor action will be discussed
under key contractor actions.
2. Requirements
The 1993 IRAT recommended that the V-22 program develop a firm set of
requirements and take control of the allocated baseline [Ref. 27]. Four major builds of the
avionics software are planned. The specific requirements for each software build were
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defined and frozen at the critical design review. Any changes which may occur now that
CDR is complete are subject to a rigorous review and approval process. [Ref 27]
3. Clarification of Government Roles and Responsibilities
The 1 993 Avionics IRAT review was conducted at a point early in the transition to
an IPT management structure The IRAT found that the management process was very
immature and disorganized. [Ref. 27]
The management process has matured significantly and continues to evolve. The
program has formed new IPTs and is also augmenting the IPT structure by forming
working groups and tiger teams to address cross-cutting issues. The program management
team has clarified and communicated the role of the Government IPT representatives.
Also, the Government has better integrated its field support activities with the IPTs. As a
result of this action there is now very little confusion over the Government role with
respect to IPTs. [Ref. 27]
E. KEY CONTRACTOR ACTIONS
The 1993 Avionics IRAT determined that the V-22 avionics and VMS represented
a medium risk because the program was lacking critical skills and sound systems
engineering and software engineering processes. An important finding of the 1 993 IRAT
was that they believed the deficiencies they observed in the contractor's systems and
software development processes were sufficient to raise concern over the safety of the
VMS software. The IRAT determined that there was a potential for the program to
become high risk if the program did not correct these problems. [Ref. 27]
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As a result of the findings and recommendations of the IRATs discussed in Chapter
III, the contractors took several key actions to reduce the risk to software development.
1. Software Engineering and Systems Engineering
BH has made significant progress toward developing a structured systems
engineering and software engineering approach to the avionics system development. They
have also focused substantial effort and attention toward separating requirements and
design, documenting each appropriately. In addition, they have strengthened their process
for tracing requirements from the top level, through allocation to hardware and software,
down to test procedures for verifying that the system meets requirements. To aid in
requirements tracing, both BH (JASS developer) and MM (VMS developer) are
developing traceability database tools. The V-22 program has also begun documenting the
requirements partitioning in functional and allocated baselines, the Software Segment
Specification, and Software Requirements Specification. [Ref. 27]
To reduce integration risk, particularly in the development of the "coupled modes"
software, BH has completed development of a triple lab tie-in to allow their three major
development laboratories to be used together. This capability to exercise the major system
components as an integrated whole in a laboratory environment will be invaluable in
helping solve integration problems. [Ref. 27]
BH has also improved its software development environment. Nearly all the
software developers have their own workstations. BH has also updated its suite of
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software development tools and is making much better use of electronic documentation
than was noted in the initial Avionics IRAT of 1993. [Ref. 27]
BH and MM have also made significant improvements in their testing approach.
Specifically, they are developing a test-case archive that defines and documents all test
cases and procedures so that specific tests can be retrieved and repeated as necessary for
regression testing. The contractors plan to bring the test plans and procedures under
configuration control to improve control and consistency in the testing process. [Ref. 27]
2. Staffing and Personnel
As discussed under key Government actions, the change that concerned the IRAT
the most was the transition to Ada and the AMC. One of the major concerns was the lack
of Ada experience at BH. Another concern was that the avionics system development was
significantly understaffed, particularly in the software area. BH was having difficulty
finding qualified staff. [Ref. 27]
BH has done well in acquiring Ada programmers through a combination of hiring,
transfers, and training. In addition to hiring Ada programmers, other staff experienced in
avionics systems have been added to the program. BH has also successfully integrated new
people onto the team while retaining and strengthening the functional domain expertise
carried over from FSD. The program now appears to have a solid core staff with
beginning and intermediate level Ada experience. BH is also augmenting their Ada
expertise by bringing in consulting help. [Ref. 27]
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3. Software Development Process
Both BH and MM have strengthened their software development processes for the
E&MD phase of the V-22 program. The contractors plan to go through a complete top-
down process, from requirements flow-down through acceptance testing for the entire
VMS software, including software that will not change in E&MD. The process will
include tracing requirements to the software module level; performing design and code
walk-throughs; and performing all unit, integration, and system tests. [Ref 27]
4. Contractor Participation in Risk Management
One of the most important ingredients for success of the V-22 risk management
program is contractor participation. The contractors' management has taken a positive
attitude and supported the V-22 risk management program. Management support is
essential to the success of the V-22 risk management program in all areas including
software. [Ref. 30]
Another area where the risk management process has been enhanced is the
corporate environment. Boeing has a corporate standard for risk management which
requires all programs to have a risk management plan in place [Ref. 36]. The standard
emphasizes the early identification and control of program risks as fundamental Boeing
management objectives [Ref. 41]. The standard has been used on other programs at
Boeing including AWACS, F-22, and the commercial jet, 777 [Ref. 36].
The BB program office serves as the contractor focal point for risk management
and provides a co-chair for the RCB as directed in the V-22 program procedure [Ref. 32].
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The RCB meets every two weeks to review the status of selected risk items, obtain
agreement on new risks, and determine changes in levels to existing risks. [Ref. 42]
Management support, strong corporate process, and participation in the RCB
combine to enhance contractor participation in the risk management process.
5. Subcontractor Role in Risk Management
The V-22 program office cannot directly influence the subcontractors to perform
risk management. Many of the current program risks lie in the area of subcontractors.
Some of the subcontractors are represented on the various IPTs and participate in the
formal V-22 risk management process. [Ref. 30]
In the area of software risk management, subcontractor participation is dependent
on the size of the effort. In areas such as the flight control system software development,
where the effort is large and complex, the prime contractor flows the requirement for
software risk management down to the subcontractor level. [Ref. 36] Software risk
management is addressed in the flight control system subcontractor's software
development plan.
One problem encountered by the prime contractor is that many subcontractors,
both small and large, do not know how to perform risk management. For example, many
subcontractors know how to identify and assess risks but are unable to perform risk
reduction planning or mitigation. [Ref. 36] Consequently, risks may be present at
subcontractors without proper mitigation action in place to prevent the risk from becoming
a problem.
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F. AN EXAMPLE OF RISK MANAGEMENT
As mentioned earlier, the area that concerned the 1993 Avionics IRAT the most
was the transition to Ada and the AMC. The AMC and Run-Time Operating System
Program (ROSP) are derived from the LAMPS program. V-22 cost and schedule assumed
that the LAMPS program stays on schedule. Through close monitoring, it was determined
that schedule slips in the LAMPS program were an increasing concern to the V-22
program.
As a result of the concern about LAMPS schedule slips, a technical risk was identi-
fied that could affect schedule Technical managers from the Government and BH sched-
uled and conducted a program management review with the subcontractor responsible for
AMC development. The review determined that there was, in fact, a high risk that the
LAMPS schedule would slip. Accordingly, the AMC/ROSP development was changed to
a high risk status. As such, it was reported to PMA-275D, the V-22 program office risk
management focal point for entry into the risk database. [Ref 39]
A risk abatement plan for the AMC/ROSP was developed by the Avionics AIT in
accordance with the V-22 risk management procedure. The plan is shown in Appendix C.
A risk reduction profile was developed with milestones in order to monitor the progress
toward risk reduction. The profile includes such items as subassembly, software, and end
item deliveries. The complete risk reduction profile is shown in Appendix E.
The following additional action was taken by the V-22 program office to reduce the
risk on the AMC/ROSP
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• A trade study was performed to search for an alternate AMC vendor.
• The V-22 program office coordinated with the LAMPS program to maintain
schedule and minimize impacts to the V-22 program.
• Monthly in-process reviews were scheduled and conducted with the contrac-
tors.
• The V-22 program office worked with Bell-Boeing and encouraged the sub-
contractor to reorganize to better meet the needs of the V-22 program. The
reorganization resulted in additional emphasis on the V-22 program by the sub-
contractor. Bell-Boeing also provided on-site support at the subcontractor in
order to more closely manage AMC development and enhance communica-
tion. [Ref 37]
This example is typical of how computer software and hardware risks are identified,
assessed, tracked, and mitigated in the V-22 program.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the V-22 risk management process as it has evolved in
the E&MD phase of the acquisition process. V-22 program management sold this phase of
the acquisition process as a phase that would produce production representative aircraft.
Because of the huge investment of resources in the FSD phase as well as planned
investment in E&MD, program management realized that it was imperative to have an
aggressive risk management program in order to ensure program success. [Ref. 31] Also,
high program visibility has dictated that all risks, including software, be managed in a
formal, systematic, and disciplined manner.
The V-22 risk management program put into place is a well documented process
whereby risks are systematically identified, addressed, and mitigated or eliminated. The
management philosophy that software development should automatically be considered a
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moderate risk has led to added emphasis on software risk management as a part of the
overall risk management process [Ref. 31].
This chapter has attempted to highlight the importance of software risk
management in the V-22 program. It has also highlighted some of the factors that have
affected software risk management in the program. Key Government and contractor
actions taken to reduce software development risks were discussed. Finally, an example of
risk management with respect to computer software and hardware was provided along with
the action taken to mitigate the risk.
The next chapter will provide an analysis of the factors affecting software risk
management. It will also analyze the techniques used to manage software risk in the V-22
program. Lessons learned that can be applied to other programs will also be identified.
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V. ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter IV described the risk management process for the V-22 program as it has
evolved in the E&MD phase of the acquisition process. The risk management process,
which was characterized as formal, systematic, and disciplined, includes software risk
management as an integral part of the overall process.
As of 23 August 1995, there were 117 open risks in the V-22 risk database. Of
these 1 17 risks, 1 1 were considered high. Of the 1 1 open items considered high risk, seven
were schedule risks and four were technical risks. Counting closed items, a total of 390
risks had been identified and listed in the V-22 risk database. [Ref 42] These figures are
indicative of an environment where risks are aggressively identified and freely
communicated. A well documented risk management process, which includes software risk
management, is in place where risks are assessed, analyzed, and either mitigated or
eliminated.
This chapter analyzes factors that have had a significant effect on risk management,
and specifically software risk management, in the V-22 program. Techniques such as use
of the IPT process and use of software metrics will also be analyzed. The goal is to
analyze these factors and techniques for their general application to software management
problems during the acquisition process. Following the analysis, lessons learned that can
be applied to other programs will be identified.
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B. ANALYSIS
This analysis will be structured around key factors that have affected software risk
management on the V-22 program. Techniques used to manage software risk will also be
analyzed
1. Management Attention
The GAO has reported a wide variety of software development problems which
plague DOD acquisition programs. One of the more significant problems identified was a
lack of management attention [Ref 10] The V-22 program has definitely not suffered from
a lack of management attention.
From the early stages of the E&MD phase, management attention has been clearly
focused on software development as a risk to the V-22 program. The most notable
attention with respect to software development came from the PEO with cognizance over
the program. The PEO was well aware of shortfalls in the software development process
during FSD. These shortfalls were chronicled in GAO reports [Refs. 24 and 25]. The
PEO focused management attention on software development risk early in E&MD by
chartering the first IRAT in May 1993, to identify avionics and software related risk areas
as discussed in Chapter III
As a result of early, pro-active involvement by the PEO, risks were identified early
in the E&MD phase while there was ample time available to take action to reduce the risk.
Also, at the time of the first IRAT in May 1993, the E&MD contract was not finalized.
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This fact meant that the IRAT could have an impact on what was put into the contract as
far as measures to reduce software development risk.
Continued PEO focus was maintained by the subsequent chartering of three
additional IRATs as discussed in Chapter III. The IRATs were concerned with avionics
software as well as flight control system software. These IRATs have been successful in
identifying software development risks and offering general strategies for risk mitigation
and improvement. Rather than oversight, these IRATs should be viewed as a mechanism
which provided valuable assistance to the program management team of the V-22 program.
In addition to management attention at the PEO level, attention to software
development risk has also been focused at the PM level. Program management has taken
the approach in E&MD that all risks including software will be aggressively identified,
assessed, and eliminated or mitigated. The attitude of program management is that
software development should never be considered less than a moderate risk. In the V-22
program, software development is automatically considered a moderate risk and is
managed accordingly. Program management also realizes the importance of having
someone who is "smart" (technically competent) in the area of software to manage
software development in the program. Software development is currently briefed as a
moderate risk at higher level briefings given by program management. [Ref 31]
The Deputy Program Manager for Production (PMA-275D) realized the need for a
formalized risk management program early in the E&MD phase. As a result PMA-275D
took the lead in developing a formal, documented risk management program. [Ref. 31]
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PMA-275D has become the focal point for the risk management process in the V-22
program office. PMA-275D holds the title "Risk Manager" in addition to being the Deputy
Program Manager for Production. PMA-275D implements the risk management process in
the V-22 program. Having a focal point for the risk management process in the program
office is essential to ensuring the maintenance of day to day management attention.
Management attention at all levels in the V-22 program has ensured that the proper
focus has been maintained on software development as a risk thus far in the E&MD phase.
2. Personnel Experience/Competence
Program management emphasized the importance of getting someone who is
technically competent to manage the software development process. In the E&MD phase
the V-22 program has the good fortune thus far of having experienced, technically
competent personnel to handle the various aspects of software development. The ASPE's
qualifications were noted in Chapter IV. They included an undergraduate degree in
computer science with a minor in electrical engineering; software experience in the civilian
sector, and management level experience with the Government on other avionics devel-
opment programs.
In addition to staffing the avionics area, other areas such as field activities
supporting the VMS have been staffed with experienced personnel. Program management
expressed confidence in the technical expertise and management ability of the V-22
personnel who are involved in software development. Program management also
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expressed confidence in the risk management ability of the Government software experts
working on the V-22 program. [Ref 31]
Program management also has confidence in the contractor's managers in the areas
of avionics and the flight control system. The contractor's managers in these areas have
taken an aggressive approach to identifying and addressing software development risks
[Ref. 35], They have also put in place a good strategy, including the extensive use of
metrics, for identifying and tracking potential software development risks. [Ref. 31]
Personnel who are experienced and competent in software development are
essential to the success of any software intensive program. The V-22 is no exception.
3. Contract Type
Contract type has proven to be an important factor in the implementation of risk
management in the V-22 program. As discussed in Chapter IV, the type of contract used
in FSD was a fixed-price type contract. With this type of contract there was little
opportunity for the Government to influence software development. The 1993 Flight
Control Software Development Assessment Team commented that the type of contract
used in FSD led the contractor to take short cuts in certain areas related to software
development such as software engineering, systems engineering, and validation testing.
These short cuts resulted in increased risk to the V-22 program. [Ref. 28]
In May 1994, the E&MD contract was definitized as a CPAF contract. This type
of contract gives the V-22 program the flexibility to provide incentives in certain areas
where additional emphasis is desired from the contractor. The area of risk management is
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an award fee criterion. An award fee board meets periodically to review the contractor's
performance. The amount awarded is based on the contractor's performance in relation to
the award fee criteria.
The type of contract used has been instrumental in providing motivation for the
contractor to demonstrate an active risk management program that identifies areas of risk
and provides for corrective action.
4. Analysis and Integration Teams (AITs) and Integrated Product Teams
(IPTs) and Their Roles
The V-22 program is structured with AITs and IPTs. The AITs consist of IPTs
and are assigned around functional disciplines. Appendix D provides a description of how
the AITs and IPTs operate and how they are structured.
From a software risk management perspective the AIT/IPT structure has a distinct
advantage. Every computer software and hardware configuration item on the V-22 aircraft
falls under the purview of an IPT for management purposes. The Government has
membership on and participates in all IPTs. The primary method for risk identification is
through the IPT process. Therefore, when a risk is identified in an IPT meeting the
Government has immediate visibility. Early visibility allows appropriate corrective action
to be initiated before the risk becomes a problem.
While the IPT structure is good for risk management it can have its drawbacks,
especially in the early stages of implementation. The 1993 Avionics IRAT noted that the
V-22 program was at an early point in the transition to an IPT structure. Because roles
and responsibilities of the Government IPT members were not clearly identified, the IRAT
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found that the management process was very immature and disorganized. [Ref. 27] Since
1993, the program management team has clarified and communicated the roles and
responsibilities of the Government IPT representatives. For IPTs to be successful, their
roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined.
With respect to risk management the reason the IPT structure has been successful is
that the IPTs and AITs have clearly defined roles and responsibilities. These roles and
responsibilities are formally documented in the program procedure for risk management
[Ref. 32]
This research has shown that the IPT structure can be effective when properly
organized. Also, it is imperative that roles and responsibilities be clearly defined. In the V-
22 program the IPT structure facilitates the early identification of computer software and
hardware risks. Early identification of risks allows mitigation actions to be put in place
before the risks develop into the "software disasters" described in Chapter II.
5. Use of Software Metrics as a Risk Management Tool
The V-22 program office believes that software metrics are essential management
indicators necessary to track software development [Ref. 23], Software metrics provide
measures of the software process, its products, and related resources. On a monthly basis,
data for the metrics are collected by the V-22 contractor avionics software manager. The
metrics are used to generate software management indicators (SMIs). The SMIs report
status compared to plans, schedules, and allocations. Also, the SMIs provide insight into
the quality level of products and the effectiveness of the software development process.
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This comparison of actual results versus planned results indicates either success with
carrying out plans or indicates potential problems (risks) due to unforeseen circumstances
or changing needs. Indicator data can provide a basis for timely re-planning and corrective
action. [Ref. 38]
Metrics are provided in the SDSR and are contractually required. The SDSR is
generated on a quarterly basis and made available to management personnel, the contractor
project office, Defense Plant Representative Office, and the V-22 program office. [Ref. 38]
The metrics provided in the SDSR are listed below.
• Memory Resource Utilization. This metric represents the amount of memory




Processing Time Utilization. This metric represents the worst case percent
usage for a major processing frame and the worst case percent usage for all
minor frames.
High Order Language (HOL). This metric represents the percent of the total
object code generated by the compilation ofHOL statements.
• Software Designed. This metric represents the number of computer software
units (CSUs) designed as a percent of the total number of units required to
satisfy the functional requirements.
• Software Coded. This metric represents the number of CSUs coded as a
percent of the total number of units required to satisfy the functional
requirements.
• Software Units Tested. This metric represents the number of CSUs
successfully tested as a percent of the total number of units required to satisfy
the functional requirements.
• Closed Problem/Change Report (PCR) This metric represents the closed PCRs
as a percent of the total number of PCRs.
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• Functional Requirements Verified This metric represents the number of
functional requirements fully verified as a percent of the total functional
requirements in the Software Requirements Specification.
• Input/Output (I/O) Utilization This metric represents the I/O used, both
hardware and software addressable I/O units, as a percentage of the total I/O
available. An I/O unit is a single discrete analog path.[Ref. 23]
In addition to the SDSR, various other reports containing metrics are submitted by
the contractor AIT and IPT meeting minutes also contain metrics and are provided
monthly from the contractor to the V-22 program office.
As E&MD has progressed, the need for additional metrics was identified These
additional metrics were developed using a Boeing Defense & Space Group EOI. One of
the additional metric indicators developed was the stop light chart which was discussed in
Chapter IV. The stop light charts are supported by lower level metrics and are generated
using a process to remove as much subjectivity as possible. The stop light charts provide a
monthly software assessment. The primary benefit from the use of the stop light charts is
that they provide a single top level assessment of the state of health of software
development. This metric, while not contractually required, is delivered monthly for
evaluation. [Ref 23] The fact that the stop light chart is provided by the contractor even
though it is not contractually required is indicative of the contractor's willingness to work
with the program office to provide needed information
Software metrics are a valuable tool to both the contractor and the V-22 program
office. Indicator data, including trend analysis, is used at a detailed level by engineering
and supervisory personnel at both the contractor and the V-22 program office An
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important point is that any one indicator only provides insight into a singular aspect of a
process or a product. Therefore, indicators and related information are viewed collectively
to determine the overall status of software development. [Ref 38]
In the V-22 program, metrics allow managers to plan and manage the process of
software development, as well as control the use of resources. Metrics also indicate where
improvements can be made and allow management to measure how well the improvements
add to the process.
Software metrics have also been used by the V-22 program office as an important
software risk management tool. The SMIs and stop light charts are continually analyzed by
the V-22 program office to determine the health of software development. The SMIs not
only provide valuable data on past and current performance but are used to identify trends
which indicate increased risk. The stop light chart is an excellent technique for
summarizing lower level metrics.
This research has revealed that software metrics are, in fact, essential to the
software risk management process in the V-22 program. Also, contractor cooperation has
proven to be a factor in providing additional metrics as the E&MD phase has progressed.
The research also revealed that the cost of acquiring software metrics is conservatively
estimated at $75 K per year [Ref. 43]. Although formal analysis was not conducted, the
Deputy Program Manager stated that the benefit of acquiring software metrics outweighs
the cost [Ref. 35]
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6. Contractor Improvement Efforts
Chapter III discussed the important role the IRATs played in the risk management
process. The IRATs focused on the JASS and flight control system CSCIs. Several areas
of concern related to contractor software development were identified early in the E&MD
phase. These areas of concern, if not addressed by the contractor, would lead to increased
risk in the E&MD phase of the program.
The major areas of concern were in the areas of software engineering and systems
engineering. Software development processes, with respect to requirements traceability
and testing, were also areas of concern. Another area of concern was the transition to Ada
and the AMC for the JASS CSCI. The reason for concern was the lack of contractor staff
experienced in Ada development and the immaturity of the contractor software
development process.
Chapter IV identified numerous actions the contractors have taken to reduce the
risk of software development in the E&MD phase of the program in the areas of avionics
and the flight control system. The most important improvement was that Boeing had made
significant progress toward developing a structured systems engineering and software
engineering approach to the avionics system development. [Ref. 27] Other improvements
were made in the areas of testing, integration, staffing, and software development
environment. [Ref. 27]
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These improvements, which were driven by the recommendations of the IRAT and
focused management attention, have significantly reduced the risk of software development
in the E&MD phase of the V-22 program.
7. Contractor Participation in Risk Management
The prime contractor team, Bell-Boeing, has actively participated in the risk
management process throughout the E&MD phase. Also, Bell-Boeing management has
been supportive of the V-22 risk management process. Prime contractor management
support is deemed essential by the V-22 program office for successful implementation of
the risk management process. [Ref. 30]
8. The V-22 Risk Management Environment
It is useful to summarize what this research has found to be the most important
aspects of the V-22 risk management environment.
• Risk Management Philosophy The V-22 risk management philosophy is to
create an open, honest, risk aware culture in which risk management is consid-
ered to be a normal, healthy aspect of overall program management. The V-22
program has, in fact, created an environment where this philosophy is put into
action.
• Structured and Documented Process. The risk management process is docu-
mented in a formal, written procedure that is disseminated throughout the V-22
program structure.
• Risk Management Control Board (RCB). The RCB is an integrated manage-
ment team consisting of representatives from the customer and Bell-Boeing. It
is responsible for overseeing the risk management process for the program and
helps to ensure contractor participation
• Risk Database. A common risk database acknowledged by both the customer
and contractor The database contains all risks, both open and closed.
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• Communication. There are no barriers to communication within the program
structure. The IPT process is the normal means of communicating risk
information. However, both formal in informal means are used to communicate
risk information.
C. LESSONS LEARNED
This section presents a list of software risk management and risk management
lessons learned that were generalized from the V-22 case analysis.
• PEOs can assist program managers of software intensive programs by conduct-
ing independent risk assessments. The goal of the assessments should be to
assist the PM in identifying software related risks. These assessments should be
conducted early enough in the acquisition process so that risks can be identified
and appropriate action taken.
• PMs should always consider software development at least a moderate risk.
Many PMs have not had extensive training in the area of software development
risks. Therefore, PMs may tend to consider software development as low risk
or ignore it altogether. This ignorance of software can lead to disaster. In the
V-22 program, the program management attitude is to consider all software
development as at least a moderate risk and find someone who is "smart" on
software to manage it.
• Have a program office focal point for risk management. Having a focal point
for the risk management process in the program office is essential to ensuring




PMs must find someone who is experienced and technically competent to man-
age software development. The V-22 program has the good fortune to have
experienced, technically competent personnel to manage software development.
When contractor performance is required in a certain area, use a CPAF
contract. The CPAF contract gives the program manager the flexibility to
provide incentives for the contractor to perform in desired areas. In the V-22
program, risk management is a major award fee criterion.
Make risk management fit the program structure. The V-22 program structure
uses IPTs and AITs. The risk management process has been effectively tailored
to fit into the IPT/AIT program structure. The IPT process is the primary




Ensure risk management roles and responsibilities are clearly understood by all
involved The formally documented V-22 risk management procedure clearly
spells out the roles of IPTs, AITs, contractors, and the RCB.
Software metrics should be used as a risk management tool. Metrics can be
used not only to determine past performance but can also be used to predict
future performance. The V-22 program makes extensive use of metrics to
identify risks. The program office should work with the contractor to tailor the
metrics package to the needs of the program.
Contractor participation in risk management is essential. The contractor team,
Bell-Boeing, has fully supported the V-22 risk management process.
Risk management is manpower intensive. In the V-22 program many people
are involved in the risk management process. Several people are involved on an
almost full-time basis and many are involved on a part-time basis.
A risk database is essential for the tracking risks.
In large programs an integrated risk management control board with represen-
tatives from the program office and the contractor should be formed. The
board serves the valuable purpose of overseeing the risk management process.
It also serves the secondary purpose of ensuring contractor participation in the
risk management process.
There should be no barriers to communication of risk. In the V-22 program
both formal and informal methods are use to communicate risks.
Software risk management should be part of the overall risk management
process and not a stand alone subsystem used only by software risk managers.
Software risk issues should be reported in enough granularity to meaningfully
identify the specific software risk.
D. SUMMARY
Many factors have influenced software risk management and risk management in
the V-22 program This chapter has analyzed the key factors that have affected software
risk management as well as risk management on the V-22 program It has also analyzed
•
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some of the techniques to manage software risk such as metrics and the IPT structure.
Finally, lessons learned which can be applied to other programs were provided.
The next chapter will provide conclusions. It will also provide a set of recommen-
dations related to the lessons learned in this chapter.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter will begin by presenting conclusions to the research effort. The
conclusions will be followed by a set of recommendations which can be considered as
possible ways to improve the acquisition of software intensive systems by DOD. These
recommendations will mainly be aimed at what can be done to reduce the risk inherent in
software development. The chapter will also include answers to the thesis questions used
in this research effort. A recommendation for further study will be included at the end of
the chapter.
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis began by emphasizing the important role that software plays in DOD
weapon systems. Many of our key weapon systems are completely dependent on software
to function properly [Ref 1] This software is extremely challenging to develop and has
become a major source of problems in the system acquisition field. Program offices for
software intensive weapon systems are facing the difficult task of managing software
development risk.
Managing software risk means being able to identify, address, and eliminate
software risk items before they become either threats to successful operation or major
sources of software rework Software risk management is important primarily because it
helps people avoid disasters, avoid rework, avoid overkill, and stimulate win-win situations
on projects involving software. [Ref. 2]
87
In the DOD acquisition process, risk management is required by policy. Software
risk management should be an integral part of risk management for all software intensive
weapon system acquisitions. However, recent estimates show that seven out of 10 major
weapon systems currently in development are encountering software problems [Ref. 44].
Many of these problems could likely have been avoided had there been proper emphasis on
software risk management.
The V-22 case studied in this paper presents an example of a successful risk
management process which includes software risk management. As the V-22 program
moved into the E&MD phase of the acquisition process, program management realized the
need for a formal risk management program which aggressively identifies and mitigates or
eliminates all risks, including software development risks.
The V-22 program has effectively implemented the software risk management
process within the IPT/AIT program structure. Roles and responsibilities are clearly
defined for software risk management. The software risk management process has been
enhanced by the use of carefully tailored metrics which aid in the identification of risk. As
the program has progressed in the E&MD phase, additional metrics were identified by the
Government. The contractor cooperated by providing these additional metrics.
Many factors have combined to enhance the software risk management environ-
ment in the V-22 program Management attention at the PEO(A) and PM levels provided
the stimulus for increased attention to software development risk. This attention led to the
IRATs which identified several software related risks. These risks were identified early
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enough so that action could be taken to reduce or eliminate the risks before a software dis-
aster occurred. Other important factors are: personnel experience/competence, contract
type, and contractor participation in risk management.
The V-22 risk management process is formal and systematic. It is applied in a
disciplined manner. Although it is fairly early in the E&MD phase, the action taken to
reduce software development risk has had a tremendous impact. Several major risk areas
have been identified, and action has been taken to eliminate or mitigate the risk. It remains
to be seen how effective these actions will prove to be. First flight of aircraft number
seven, the first E&MD aircraft, is scheduled to occur in December 1996. If this flight
occurs as scheduled, with planned software functionality, then the actions taken will have
been successful.
The lessons learned in the V-22 case can be applied to other software intensive
systems in DOD Although the V-22 is an aircraft development program, the majority of
learning points involved in the software risk management process of the V-22 program are
common to the DOD procurement environment. Therefore, the lessons learned can readily
be generalized to a large population of software intensive systems being developed by
DOD
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are a result of this research. These recommenda-
tions are aimed at managers within the acquisition hierarchy: PMs, PEOs, and component
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acquisition executives who are in the best position to ensure that software risk management
is implemented.
1. Create an Environment Where Risks are Freely Communicated
The PM must create an environment where risks are freely communicated. The
V-22 risk management philosophy is to create an open, honest, risk-aware culture in which
risk management is considered to be a normal, healthy aspect of overall program manage-
ment [Ref. 32], There must be no barriers to the communication of risk within the pro-
gram management structure. Likewise, the PM should feel free to communicate program
risks to the PEO. This type of environment is required in order for risk management to be
successful.
2. PEOs Provide Assistance to PMs in the Area of Software Risk
Management
PEOs are in a position to assist PMs in a number of ways. In the V-22 program the
PEO(A) chartered several IRATs to assist the PM in identifying software related risk areas.
These IRATs identified several areas of software related risk which, if not corrected, would
lead to future problems PEOs could assist PMs by having periodic risk assessments
conducted on software intensive programs. The purpose of such assessments would be to
assist PMs in identifying software related risk areas and to provide recommendations which
would mitigate or eliminate the risk(s).
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3. Use CPAF Contracts to Motivate Contractors to Perform Risk
Management
CPAF contracts allow the PM to provide an incentive to the contractor(s) in certain
areas where additional emphasis is desired In the V-22 program, an award fee criterion is
risk management Having risk management as an award fee criterion is crucial in getting
the contractor to participate in the risk management process.
4. Use Software Metrics as a Risk Management Tool
Metrics can be used not only to ascertain past and current performance but can also
be used to predict future performance. In the V-22 program a variety of metrics are used
to determine the status of software development. These metrics are continually analyzed in
order to identify potential problem areas.
Through cooperation with the contractor a carefully tailored set of software metrics
should be devised for every software intensive program. These metrics should be
contractually required and fit the needs of the program. Metrics are by no means a "silver
bullet". Metrics are just one of many tools that should be used to enhance the software
risk management process.
5. Assess Contractor Capability for Software Development Prior to
Contract Award
The process of assessing a contractor's software development capability was
discussed in Chapter II. The SEI developed a means whereby the software process
maturity of contractors could be evaluated. A developer is assessed, evaluated, its
strengths and weaknesses defined, and a program of process maturity improvement is
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established [Ref. 17:p. 4.15-3]. A major advantage which DOD derives from the applica-
tion of the process maturity evaluation is the identification of program risks due to poor
software quality products or immature development processes.
Regardless of the method used, there should be an effort to assess the contractor's
capability for software development prior to contract award for software intensive weapon
systems. Software capability evaluations can also be applied during the contract as a
contract monitoring process. Using these evaluations offers the Government an
opportunity to minimize the risk and uncertainty in software development when dealing
with a particular contractor or development agency.
6. Ensure Personnel Competency in Key Positions
Most PMs have not received extensive training in the area of software
development. The development of quality software is a complex, highly technical process.
Therefore, the PM must have someone on the staff who is competent in the area of
software development. V-22 program management emphasized the importance of having
someone who is "smart" in software to manage software development for the Government
[Ref. 31]
7. Ensure Roles of Risk Management Participants are Clearly
Understood
This recommendation is particularly important for major programs where the
program structure is large and many organizations are involved in addition to the program
office. A good method to inform participants of their roles is to document their roles in a
formal procedure and disseminate that procedure throughout the program structure. The
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V-22 program has a written procedure for risk management. In this procedure the roles of
all participants in the risk management process are clearly defined. Therefore, there is no
confusion over the roles of risk management participants.
C. ANSWERS TO THESIS QUESTIONS
1. How is software risk management addressed on the V-22 aircraft
program?
Software risk management can be addressed in a number of different ways. As
stated in Chapter IV, there are no "cookbook" solutions to risk management. The V-22
program has a formal, systematic, and disciplined risk management process which includes
software risk management. All risks, including software related risks, are aggressively
identified, assessed, and mitigated or eliminated.
Software risk management is addressed in a variety of ways in the V-22 program.
This process can be applied to other programs as well
The general concepts developed from studying the V-22 case are as follows:
• Management attention at the PEO and PM level should focus on the risk of
software development in software intensive weapon system acquisitions.
• The highly complex nature of software development dictates that competent,
technically proficient Government personnel be assigned to manage software
development on software intensive programs.
• The type of contract can have an impact on the level of contractor participation
in risk management. The contract can provide an incentive for the contractor to
participate in risk management
• The software risk management process must fit into the overall risk manage-
ment process as well as the program structure. In the V-22 program software
risk management has been effectively implemented within the AIT/IPT program
structure.
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• Software metrics should be used as a risk management tool.
• Contractor participation in risk management is crucial and should be actively
cultivated.
2. What are the computer software components associated with the
V-22?
The CSCIs for the V-22 were identified in Chapter III. A detailed description of
the CSCIs is provided in Appendix B.
3. What are the computer software components that have posed the
greatest risk in the current phase of the acquisition process? What is being done to
reduce the risk of software development for these software components?
The CSCIs that have posed the greatest risk in E&MD are the avionics (JASS) and
flight control system (VMS).
The IRATs discussed in Chapter III were chartered to identify software related
areas of risk with respect to the avionics and flight control system CSCIs. The IRATs
identified several areas of risk for both of these CSCIs. Chapter IV described key
Government and contractor actions that are being taken to reduce the software
development risks for the avionics and flight control system CSCIs.
In addition to the IRATs the normal process for risk identification has been used to
identify other computer software and hardware related risk areas. An example of one of
these risks was provided in Chapter IV along with the mitigation action being taken to
reduce the risk.
4. What risk management techniques were used in the past? Was
software included in the risk management process?
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In the FSD phase of the program, informal risk management techniques were used
[Ref 31] Due to the informal nature of risk management in the FSD phase, as well as the
time lapse since FSD, the author was unable to determine if software risk management was
included in the risk management process during FSD.
5. If a formal risk management process was not used, what problems
occurred in software development that may have been averted had there been a
formal software risk management program?
As noted earlier, the risk management process was informal during the FSD phase
of the program. The IRATs discussed in Chapter III noted many areas of concern with
respect to the way software development was conducted in the FSD phase for the avionics
and flight control systems Some of the areas with serious shortcomings in FSD were
systems engineering, software engineering, and testing and integration.
It is difficult to say which, if any, of the concerns identified in the IRATs could have
been avoided had there been a formal risk management process in FSD. Certainly, some of
the potential problems could have been identified had there been a formal process in place
for software risk management. However, due to the fixed price nature of the contract in
FSD, as well as the budget cutting environment of the late 1980s, it is unlikely that
adequate resources could have been devoted to risk mitigation or elimination even if all of
the software related risks had been identified. Also, it must be remembered that prior to
1989, there were very few sources of information that described software risks or how to
deal with them [Ref. 16].
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The program is now well into the E&MD phase of the acquisition process and has a
formal risk management program which includes software. This environment has allowed
the aggressive identification of software related risks. So far no software related problems
have occurred in E&MD that were not previously identified as risks.
6. What are the lessons learned using software risk management on the
V-22 program?
The lessons learned were identified in Chapter V.
D. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE STUDY
More studies should be conducted in the area of software risk management. There
are many other software intensive weapon system acquisitions in DOD. No doubt many of
these other programs have devised innovative methods for managing the risks inherent in
the development of complex software. The acquisition community could benefit from case
studies of software risk management. Perhaps common software risk management tech-
niques from several successful programs could be combined to create a paradigm for soft-
ware risk management throughout DOD.
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APPENDIX A. THE SEI SOFTWARE RISK EVALUATION (SRE) PROCESS
The main purpose of this appendix is to provide the reader with some background
information on the SRE process. A secondary purpose is to relate the author's experiences
and insight as a result of having participated in the execution phase of an SRE.
As discussed in Chapter II, one of the services that the SEI provides is the SRE.
The SRE method is used for identifying, analyzing, communicating, and mitigating
software risks. The SRE method is intended to be used by decision makers for managing
the software risks of software intensive programs and projects. The SRE method
facilitates the mitigation of software risks for managers. [Ref 45]
The SEI has produced a technical report [Ref. 45] that provides a high level
description of the method. The long term goals of the SEI with respect to the SRE method
are to ensure that:
• The method is defined and can be applied in a systematic, disciplined, and
efficient manner.
• For a specific program or project, at any given instance of its application, there
is uniformity in the outcome of the risk findings and mitigation.
• It is flexible enough to be used in different situations and phases of the life
cycle, including acquisition and maintenance. [Ref. 45]
The SRE is implemented in four phases: commitment, preparation, execution, and
mitigation.
• Commitment consists of activities to establish the need, identify program or
project goals, and obtain agreements for the SRE.
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• Preparation consists of planning and coordination activities that are performed
prior to the site visit for executing the SRE.
• Execution consists of activities to implement the SRE functions during a site
visit to the location of the target program.
• Mitigation consists of activities to mitigate the risks that were identified during
the software risk evaluation. [Ref 45]
The SRE can be applied in different situations and within different environments.
The author was a member of an SEI team that was recruited by a Government program
office. The program manager requested an independent evaluation of the software
development risks facing the organization.
Of the four activities mentioned above, the author actively participated in the
execution phase of the SRE. The SRE team consisted of seven members distributed as
follows: three from SEI, two from an independent organization, one from the program
office, and the author. The team members performed various roles during the SRE. Since
the author participated in the execution phase, that phase of the SRE will be addressed
here
The execution phase consists of those activities that are performed during a site
visit of the SRE team to the location of the target program SREs are tailored to an
organization's needs, and each SRE may vary slightly depending on the organization. This
particular SRE execution phase lasted one week and consisted of the following activities:
site orientation/program briefing, interview sessions, analysis sessions, risk data
consolidation, and a results briefing.
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The purpose of the site orientation is for all individuals participating in the
execution phase activities to be aware of:
• the objectives of performing the evaluation
• the implementation phases of the SRE
• the individual's role in the implementation phases. [Ref 45]
The purpose of the program briefing is for knowledgeable representatives to present a
summary of the organization's structure, context, and technical aspects of the target
program. [Ref. 45]
The purpose of the interview sessions is to perform risk detection and specification.
Each interview session begins with the interviewer using an introductory script followed by
questions from the taxonomy-based questionnaire (TBQ). The TBQ is a tool used to
identify software risks in a program. The purpose of this tool is to ensure coverage of all
potential risk areas by asking questions at a detailed attribute level of the software risk
taxonomy. The SEI software risk taxonomy provides a basis for organizing and. studying
various aspects of software risks in a program. [Ref. 45]
The interview process is designed to facilitate the detection of risks on the basis of
the participants' discussion rather than by rigidly following the structure of the TBQ. The
participants are encouraged to follow any thread of discussion or thought as long as they
are objectively discussing potential risks when responding to questions, or to subsequent
follow on probes, or to cues, or begin to discuss among themselves. [Ref. 45] In this
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particular SRE there were seven interview groups with a total of 35 individuals. The
groups consisted of a variety of personnel including management and technical personnel.
When a risk is identified the risk recorder documents the risk. The risk recorder
uses the wording of the respondents, and if the meaning is not clear will clarify the
statement before documenting it. The risk recorder or another designated person is
responsible for entering the risks into an automated analysis tool.[Ref 45]
A session recorder takes notes on the context and other pertinent discussions
during the risk detection activities. Other SRE team members also take notes to ensure the
following:
• Any potential risk, issue, or concern that was raised by an interviewee is not
overlooked.
• The source of the risk is clearly identifiable and can be tagged to a category in
the SEI taxonomy of software development risks
• Sufficient information is available for the team to make an objective assessment
of each risk that was detected. [Ref. 45]
The purpose of the analysis session is to complete the functions of risk specification
and risk assessment. The analysis session is performed by the SRE team. The session is
performed immediately after each interview session when the context of the risk is still
fresh in the minds of the SRE team members. Each team member is provided a copy of the
recorded risks. The SRE team discusses only those risks where the wording of the risk
statements is of concern and may need to be changed. The team members individually
score each risk using the selected assessment mechanism. The team then discusses those
risks that have a significant deviation in their scores and reaches consensus. During the
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analysis session each risk will also be tagged to a taxonomy group; that is, it will be tagged
as belonging to a specific class-element-attribute in the software risk taxonomy. During
this session the risk recorder or a designated person enters the risk statement corrections,
risk assessment scores, and source of risk categories into the automated analysis tool.[Ref
45]
The purpose of the consolidation session is to perform the risk consolidation and if
necessary, revise the assessments of the consolidated risks. The session is performed by
the SRE team and is held after all the analysis sessions have been completed. Each SRE
team member is provided with a copy of the risks from the analysis sessions sorted by their
levels of magnitude within each risk category. The SRE team jointly examines the risks
within each category to determine if there are candidates for consolidation. The team
reaches consensus on the wording and revisits the assessment scores of the consolidated
risks if necessary. A risk recorder enters the consolidated risk statements and their revised
risk assessments into the automated analysis tool.[Ref 45]
After the consolidation of risks a briefing is prepared. The contents of the briefing
are a listing of the risk statements that were identified during the execution phase and
sorted by their source of risk categories and levels of magnitude. Although all risk findings
may be presented, the focus of the data confirmation should be on the more important
ones, that is, those risks that were assessed at a high level of magnitude. [Ref 45] In this
SRE, 246 risk statements were collected and consolidated into 12 major risk source areas.
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The consolidation represented those risks rated to have a high impact on program software
efforts and/or high probability of occurrence.
The actual briefing is presented as the last step in the execution phase. The purpose
of the briefing is to validate the risk findings with the organization's management and all
individuals who participated in the execution phase activities. All individuals who were
involved in the execution phase activities including the management and technical
personnel associated with the target program and the SRE team members are encouraged
to attend the briefing session. The briefing session provides feedback to the organization
by openly communicating the risks that were found and provides an opportunity for the
data gathered at the site to be validated. [Ref. 45]
It is important to remember that the author only participated in the execution phase
of this particular SRE. The other phases of the process are: commitment, preparation, and
mitigation.
The author actively participated in the execution phase in the roles of risk recorder,
session recorder, and observer. The author also participated in the analysis and
consolidation sessions. The following are the author's observations with respect to the
execution phase of the SRE process.
• The process is well defined, disciplined, and systematic.
• The process can be tailored to fit different programs in different phases of
acquisition.
• The process is an excellent tool for identifying software development risks. The
process can and probably should be used for all software intensive DOD
acquisition programs.
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• The process for assessing risks is somewhat subjective and depends heavily on
the expert judgment of team members.
• All software development risks may not be identified. However, the author is
confident that at least 85-90% of the major risks were identified.
• Program manager commitment to the process is extremely important
• Organizational commitment/participation is also extremely important. The right
program personnel must be available to the team for the interviews at the
designated time In this case, there was 100% participation from the
organization that was being evaluated. There was also a good cross-section of




APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTION OF V-22 COMPUTER SOFTWARE
CONFIGURATION ITEMS (CSCIs) AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE
1. Integrated Avionics System
The V-22 Integrated Avionics System (IAS) consists of hardware and software
installed and integrated in the V-22 aircraft. The avionics system is comprised of dual
redundant Advanced Mission Computers (AMCs) configured with a single Reduced
Instruction Set Computing (RISC) Computer Module (RCM) based on a MIPS R4400
processor which perform system control, system monitoring, MIL-STD-1553B data bus
control, and subsystem processing functions. The mission computers are integrated with
the avionics equipment through three dual redundant MIL-STD-1553 data buses. Two of
these buses allow for communication between the two AMCs and the IAS. The third bus
is dedicated to communication between the two AMCs. JASS controls the IAS either
through one of the data buses directly or through one of four interface units (IUs). the IUs
provide data conversion between the MIL-STD-1553B formatted data to and from the
mission computer and other data formats used by non MIL-STD-1553B compatible
equipment. [Ref 23]
The JASS tactical software provides integrated control and centralized data
processing for the V-22 avionics system. Ada is the language used in developing
JASS [Ref 23]
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2. Digital Flight Control System (DFCS)
The V-22 DFCS consists of primary and secondary devices including electronic
sensing and computing devices which in combination with the aircraft control surfaces
enable the crew to control the flight path of the aircraft. It provides primary flight control
system (PFCS) functions necessary for safe control of the aircraft as well as automatic
flight control system (AFCS) functions required to accomplish V-22 missions. It
commences with flight crew cockpit controls and extends through the surface and
swashplate actuators and digital engine controls. It is fly-by-wire implementation
employing triplex in-line monitored sensors and computers, and shall be two-fail/operate
with respect to sensing, computing, and control valves for flight critical (PFCS) functions
and one-fail/operate with respect to automatic (AFCS) functions. [Ref. 23]
The flight control computer software is implemented in one CSCI. This CSCI
provides logic for input/output, control law, and built-in-test processing. The PFCS
control laws perform all flight critical computations and redundancy management. The
AFCS control laws include those providing stability and control augmentation and
mission related selectable modes of the flight control system. The input/output (I/O)
processor logic controls most of the hardware interfaces in the flight control computer. It
then passes the I/O data between the interfaces and the PFCS and AFCS operational flight
programs DFCS software is coded in assembly language. [Ref. 23]
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3. V-22 Mission Planning System (VMPS)
The VMPS will provide V-22 personnel with an automated mission planning
system. The primary purposes of the VMPS are to allow a pilot to plan out a mission and
populate the databases in the V-22 aircraft mission computer just prior to commencing
mission and to provide digital map data for the on-board digital map system. The Tactical
Automated Mission Planning System (TAMPS) has been designated as the Navy and
Marine Corps standard mission planning system The TAMPS is a ground based system
consisting of core hardware and software that provides common mission planning data to
various aircraft types in the Navy and Marine Corps. A platform specific V-22 Mission
Planning Module (VMPM) is in development to operate within the TAMPS
environment. [Ref. 23]
The VMPM is a software configuration item that physically runs within TAMPS.
TAMPS will download data to a cartridge to upload flight and communication plans into
the aircraft. The VMPM software must accept output from the core TAMPS system and
provide data in a format compatible with the avionics, communications, and digital
mapping systems of the V-22. VMPS software is coded in C.[Ref. 23]
4. Maintenance Data Processing System (MDPS)
The MDPS supports maintenance of the V-22 by receiving, processing, reporting,
and distributing V-22 maintenance data. The primary missions of the MDPS are reading
and processing data recorded on a Mission Data Loader (MDL) by a V-22 during flight,
maintaining aircraft configuration and usage data, and generating reports. The MDPS also
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maintains inventories of installed V-22 life-limited parts at the local organization, reports
data up-line to data collection agencies, and exchanges data with other MDPS stations.
The MDPS hardware consists of an 80486/66 Megahertz processor along with peripheral
devices to support operation ofMDPS software. [Ref. 23]
The MDPS CSCI is menu-driven. The menus will present a structured and
standardized appearance that is usable by personnel with any level of computer experience.
Displays other than menus will be generated and presented to the user as rapidly as
possible Data entry screens will be formatted to ease the entry of information by the
operator. Display and entry of data for standard maintenance forms will duplicate the
format of the paper form. Information typed by the user will be verified as it is entered.
MDPS software is coded in Ada. [Ref. 23]
5. Display Electronics Unit (DEU)
The primary purpose of the V-22 DEU is to provide an integrated interface for the
control and display portion of the JASS and display units. To support this interface, the
DEU provides display generation processing as directed by the JASS and processing of
operator control inputs received via the multi-function displays. Operator control inputs
and display system status are provided for sampling by the JASS over MIL-STD-1750A
processors in the DEU systems. DEU software is coded in C and Assembly. [Ref. 21]
6. Vibration, Structural Life, and Engine Diagnostic (VSLED)
The VSLED system contributes functionally to the V-22 central integrated
checkout system as an aircraft health monitoring system. The VSLED system provides a
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data collection, storage, and on-board analysis capability for the aircraft drive system and
its associated support structure. VSLED software is coded in Jovial. [Ref. 21]
7. Interface Units
Several interface units, consisting of both hardware and software, exist to perform
various functions. These interface units are the Avionics Bay Interface Unit (ABIU), Wing
Interface Unit (WIU), and Nacelle Interface Units (NIUs). [Ref. 21]
The ABIU consists of hardware and software installed and integrated with the
avionics and non-avionics equipment through a dual redundant MIL-STD-1553B data bus,
other serial buses, and various analog and discrete signals. ABIU hardware is based on an
8086 processor and controls/monitors different subsystems or functions. ABIU firmware is
coded in C and 8086 assembly. [Ref. 21]
The WIU consists of hardware and software installed and integrated with the
avionics and non-avionics equipment through a dual redundant MIL-STD-1553B data bus
(bus A), other serial buses, and various analog and discrete signals. WIU hardware is
based on an 8086 processor. The WIU controls/monitors 10 different subsystems or
functions The WIU firmware is written in C and 8086 assembly. [Ref. 21]
There are two identical NIUs on the V-22 aircraft. NIU #1 is located in the left
engine nacelle and monitors/controls the left engine and associated subsystems. NIU #2 is
located in the right engine nacelle and monitors/controls the right engine and associated
subsystems. The NIUs consist of hardware and software installed and integrated with the
avionics and non-avionics serial buses and various analog and discrete signals. The NIU
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hardware is based on an 8086 processor. The NIUs control/monitor 1 1 different
subsystems or functions. The NIU firmware is written in C and 8086 assembly. [Ref. 21]
8. JVX Simulation Support Software (JSSS)
The JSSS both simulates and stimulates actual avionics hardware for use in testing
of the JASS. The JSSS performs simulation functions such as the flight simulation function
which allows for control of simulated trajectories such as waypoint steering and joystick
control. This function also controls the flight modeling. Other important functions are also
simulated by the JSSS. JSSS software is coded in Fortran. [Ref. 23]
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•
Description of Potential Risk Area
-The V-22 Advanced Mission Computer (AMC) and Run-Time Operating System Program
(ROSP) are derived from the LAMPS program. V-22 cost and schedule assume that LAMPS
program stays on schedule.
Current Status
-Elevated to Moderate risk. RCB video 7/15/94
-Elevated to High risk. RCB video 4/19/95
-The development of the V-22 AMC and ROSP continues to be impacted by delays in the LAMPS
program. CDI has slid delivery of H/W and S/W by approximately 6 months. There is no
remaining schedule reserve in the V-22 schedules. Any additional slides in delivery will impact
the content of JASS S/W for first flight.
Program Action If No Action Taken
-Less than planned S/W functionality for A/C 7 first flight
• Action Required to Reduce Risk to Acceptable Levels
1
)
Develop fallback plans for contingency of additional delivery delays.
2) Coordination with LAMPS program to identify impacts on V-22.
3) Customer emphasis on LAMPS program to maintain schedule and minimize impacts to V-22.
• Fallback Plans/Workarounds
Options being considered: (1) Compression of lab integration and testing. (2) Offload of testing
from Boeing SIL to NAWC VAIL. (3) Hiring additional S/W designers at Boeing to. minimize
impact of late delivery from CDI.
• Impact of Fallback Plans/Workarounds
-Additional unplanned cost
• Closure Criteria
-Delivery of AMC and software in Feb 1996
• Due Date for Next Action
5/17/95 CDIPMR
5/3 1/95 Completion of detailed workaround/fallback plan
• Recommendation to Management
-Monitor closely and maintain pressure on customer to resolve situation.
Ill
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APPENDIX D. ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATION TEAMS (AITs) AND
INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS (IPTs)
The AITs consist of different IPTs and are designed around functional disciplines.
These teams, within their own structure, link activities from all IPTs together by identifying
objectives and scheduling product hand-off in a coordinated fashion. The Government and
Bell-Boeing assembled representatives for each AIT. These representatives coordinate all
their design issues within their assigned structure. All Government AITs are structured
under the Air Vehicle AIT, which is managed by the V-22 Class Desk. The AIT structure




• Air Frame & Systems







Subsystem & Integrated Wiring System
Empennage & Ramp
• Systems
• Vehicle Management System
V-22 IPTs are made up of Bell-Boeing and Government experienced engineers/
leaders. Each IPT operates as a miniature, self-contained program having ownership of a
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specific product and responsibility for all aspects of its development. Through IPTs, the
Government is involved in the design process early on.[Ref.23]
IPT leaders perform a role similar to a program manager, assuming full
responsibility for delivery of a product, which meets all customer requirements, schedules,
and budgets. Teams are sized small enough to enhance the working environment and
internal communication. The IPTs are responsible for requirements refinements within
their teams. Design changes/iterations are minimized by involving all functional disciplines
(i.e., reliability and maintainability, weight, cost, manufacturing, quality assurance, material,
engineering, etc.) in the initial design cycle. [Ref 23]
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APPENDIX E. RISK RECUCTION PROFILE
AMC/ROSP Risk Reduction Profile
Description Plan Actual Weight %
LBC-02 ASIC Release to FAB 6/5/95 6/23/95 2
MCC-02 ASIC Release to FAB 6/5/95 6/30/95 2
First ROSPw/1 553 Drop 6/16/95 6/16/95 5
IOC ASIC Stress Testing Complete 6/16/95 6/20/95 3
LIFE 3 Prototype Delivery 6/23/95 7/5/95 5
Frist AMC Block 1 Delivery 6/27/95 5
LBC-02 ASIC Prototype Delivery 7/31/95 3
MCC-02 ASIC Prototype Delivery 7/31/95 3
Last AMC Block 1 Delivery 8/15/95 5
Benchmark Complete 8/16/95 10
ROSPFull 1553 Drop 8/16/95 10
First AMC Block 2 Delivery 9/19/95 8
Full Single Module Integration Complete 9/20/95 5
SOF Qualification Complete 9/30/95 10
ROSP Block 2 Complete 10/18/95 5
ROSP Block 2 FQT 11/17/95 10
A/C 7 Hardware & Spares 1/31/96 5
A/C 8 Hardware & Spares 2/29/96 4









































, Deputy for Production, V-22 Program Office, Naval Air Systems Command,
Arlington, VA Interview, 19 September 1995.
2. Giles, T., Flight Control System Support Activity Manager, Naval Air Warfare Center,
Patuxent River, MD, Interview, 19 September 1995.
3. Schleicher, R., Deputy Program Manager, V-22 Program, Naval Air Systems
Command, Arlington, VA, Interview, 19 September 1995.




V-22 Avionics System Project Engineer, Naval Air Systems Command,
Arlington, VA, Interview, 21 September 1995.
6. Tolan, G , Project Lead for the V-22 Mission Planning System, Naval Air Warfare
Center, Indianapolis, IN, Interview, 22 September 1995.
7 Heselton, L., Boeing Helicopter, Risk Reduction and Test Support Integrated Product
Team, Philadelphia, PA, Interview by Phone, 27 October 1995.
8. Schleicher R., Deputy Program Manager, V-22 Program, Naval Air Systems
Command, Arlington, VA, Interview by Phone, 7 February 1996.
9. Kennedy, F
,
Avionics System Project Engineer, Naval Air Systems Command,
Arlington, VA Interview by Phone, 12 February 1996.
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Avionics Bay Interface Unit
Automatic Flight Control System
Analysis and Integration Team
Advanced Mission Computer
Application Specific Integrated Circuit
Avionics Systems Project Engineer
Boeing-Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.





Computer Resources Life Cycle Management Plan
Computer Software Configuration Item
Digital Electronics Unit
Digital Flight Control System
Department of Defense
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Independent Risk Assessment Team
Interface Unit
V-22 (JVX) Applications Systems Software
V-22 (JVX) Simulation Support Software
Joint Services Vertical Lift Aircraft
Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System
Local Bus Controller
Local Interface Futurebus+ Engine
Memory Computer Controller
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MCCR Mission Critical Computer Resources
MDL Mission Data Loader
MDPS Maintenance Data Processing System
MIPS Millions of Instructions Per Second
MM Martin-Marietta
NAV Navigation
NAWC Naval Air Warfare Center
NIU Nacelle Interface Unit
PEO Program Executive Officer
PFCS Primary Flight Control System
PM Program Manager
PO Project Officer
RCB Risk Management Control Board
RCM RISC Computer Module
RISC Reduced Instruction Set Computing
ROSP RCM Operating System Program
SDSR Software Development Status Report
SEI Software Engineering Institute
SIL Systems Integration Laboratory
SLOC Source Lines of Code














Software Product Assessment Team
Software
Tactical Automated Mission Planning Station
Test Readiness Review
V-22 Avionics Integration Laboratory
V-22 Mission Planning Module
V-22 Mission Planning System
Vehicle Management System




I Cummings, T., Corrective Software Management: The Success of the EPLRS
Program, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 1994.
2. Boehm, B.W., Tutorial: Software Risk Management, IEEE Computer Society Press,
1989.
3. Defense Science Board, Report of the Task Force on Military Software. September
1987.
4. Department of Defense, U.S. National Strategy, 1993.
5. Defense Systems Management College, Mission Critical Computer Resources
Management Guide, 1988.
6 United States General Accounting Office, GAO/IMTEC-92-62BR, Embedded
Computer Systems, Defense Does Not Know How Much It Spends on Software,
Briefing Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Research and Development,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. July 1992.
7. Software Engineering Institute Technical Report CMU/SEI-90-TR-12, Carnegie
Mellon University, National Software Capacity: Near-Term Study, by J.A.L. Siegal, S.
Stewman, S. Konda, P.D. Larkey, and W.G. Wagner, May 1990.
8. United States General Accounting Office, GAO/IMTEC-90-23, Meeting the Govern-
ment's Technology Challenge: Results ofGAO Symposium. February 1990.
9. Kitfield, J., "Is Software DOD's Achilles' Heel?," Military Forum, July 1989.
10. United States General Accounting Office, GAO/IMTEC-93-13, Mission Critical
Systems, Defense Attempting to Address Major Challenges, Report to the Chairman,
Subcommittee on Research and Development, Committee on Armed Services, House
of Representatives. November 1992.
I I Software Engineering Institute Technical Report CMU/SEI-92-TR-30, Carnegie
Mellon University, Software Development Risk: Opportunity, Not Problem, by Roger
L. Van Scoy, September 1992.
12. Defense Systems Management College, Risk Management Concepts and Guidance,
March 1989.
123
13. Software Engineering Institute Technical Review '92, Carnegie Mellon University,
Software Development Risk Management: An SEI Appraisal, by Robert J. Kirpatrick,
Julie A. Walker, and Robert Firth, 1992.
14. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, Defense Acquisition, 23 February 1991.
15. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Defense Management Acquisition Proce-
dures, 23 February 1991.
16. Jones, C, Assessment and Control ofSoftware Risks, Yourdon Press, 1994.
17. Defense Systems Management College, Program Manager's Notebook, June 1992.
18 United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-93-15, Weapons Acquisition,
A Rare Opportunityfor Lasting Change, Report from the Comptroller General of the
United States. December 1992.
19. United States General Accounting Office, GAO/IMTEC-92-48, Embedded Computer
Systems, Significant Software Problems on C-17 Must Be Addressed, Report to the
Chairman, Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, Committee on
Government Operations, House of Representatives. May 1992.
20 Operational Requirements Document for Joint Multi-mission Vertical Lift Aircraft
(JVMX), 4 April 1995.
21 Cost Analysis Requirements Descriptionfor Mlr-22, CV-22, and HV-22, CARD-94-04
(draft), 15 April 1994.
22. Department of Defense Inspector General Audit Report, Review of the V-22 Aircraft
Program, no. 94-131, 14 June 1994.
23. V-22 Program Document, Computer Resources Life Cycle Management Plan,
25 September 1995.
24 United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-91-45, Naval Aviation, The
I '-22 Osprey -- Progress and Problems, Report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. October 1990
25 United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-94-44, Navy Aviation, V-22
Development — Schedule Extended, Performance Reduced, and Costs Increased,
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
January 1994.
124
26. Integrated Program Summary, Annex D, Risk Assessmentfor the V-22 Program.
27. Department of the Navy, Program Executive Officer for Air Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW), Assault, and Special Mission Programs, V-22 Avionics System Independent
Risk Assessment Final Report, Arlington, VA, 1 September 1994.
28. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Ames Research Center, Final Report,
V-22 Flight Control System Software Development Assessment Team, Moffett Field,
CA, 31 August 1993.
29. Department of the Navy, Program Executive Officer for Air ASW, Assault, and Special
Mission Programs, V-22 Fidl Scale Development, Digital Flight Control System
Software Product Assessment Final Report, Arlington, VA, 16 December 1994.




Interview between Mr. Ray Schleicher, Deputy Program Manager for the V-22
Program, and the author, 19 September 1995.
32. V-22 Program Policy and Procedure Number 21 1 A, V-22 Risk Management,
21 October 1994.
33. Program Executive Plan for the V-22 Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Program, 16 July 1993.
34. Briefing Charts from Briefing on V-22 Risk Management, 9 May 1995.
35. Telephone interview between Mr. Ray Schleicher, Deputy Program Manager for the
V-22 Program, and the author, 7 February 1996.
36. Telephone interview between Mr. Les Heselton, Boeing Defense & Space Group,
Helicopters Division, and the author, 27 October 1995.
37 Interview between Mr. Frank Kennedy, Avionics Systems Project Engineer for the
V-22 Program, and the author, 21 September 1995.
38. Software Development Plan for the V-22 Application System Software,
16 September 1994.
39. Telefax from Mr Frank Kennedy, V-22 Program Office, 14 August 1995.
125
40 Electronic mail message from Mr. Frank Kennedy, Avionics Systems Project Engineer
for the V-22 Program, 20 October 1995.
41. Boeing Defense & Space Group Operating Procedure MA-DCT-026, Risk Manage-
ment, 15 November 1990.
42. Meeting minutes from V-22 Risk Management Control Board meeting,
25 August 1995.
43. Telephone interview between Mr. Frank Kennedy, Avionics Systems Project Engineer
for the V-22 Program, and the author, 12 February 1996.
44. United States General Accounting Office, GAO/IMTEC-90-34, Embedded Computers,
Better Focus on This Technology Could Benefit Billion Dollar Weapons Programs.
Report to the Chairman, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, Committee
on Government Operations, House of Representatives. April 1990.
45. Software Engineering Institute Technical Report CMU/SEI-94-TR- 1 9, Carnegie
Mellon University, Software Risk Evaluation Method Version J. 0, by Frank J. Sisti and
Sujoe Joseph, December 1994.
126
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Boatman, J, "Bell-Boeing Prepares for V-22 Deadline," Jane's Defence Weekly, p. 14,
9 October 1993.
Boehm, B.W., "Software Engineering," IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. C-25, no.
12, December 1976.
Boehm, BW, "Software Risk Management: Principles and Practices," IEEE Software,
vol. 8, iss. 1, pp. 32-41, January 1991.
Boehm, B.W
,
Tutorial: Software Risk Management, IEEE Computer Society Press,
1989
Brill, A.E., Techniques of EDP Project Management: A Book of Readings, Yourdon
Press, 1984.
Bunyard, J.M., "Today's Risks in Software Development — Can They Be Significantly
Reduced?" The Journal of Defense Systems Acquisition Management, vol 5, no 4, pp
73-94, 1982.
Cost Analysis Requirements Description for MV-22, CV-22, and HV-22, CARD-94-04
(draft), 15 April 1994.
Cummings, T., Corrective Software Management: The Success of the EPLRS Program,
Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 1994.
Davis, R., "Reducing Software Management Risks," Defense Systems Management
Review, vol. I, no. 6, pp. 16-23, Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, VA,
1978.
Defense Science Board, Report of the Task Force on Military Software. September 1987.
Defense Systems Management College, Mission Critical Computer Resources Manage-
ment Guide, 1988
Defense Systems Management College, Program Manager's Notebook, June 1992.
Defense Systems Management College, Risk Management Concepts and Guidance,
March 1989.
127
Defense Systems Management College, Systems Engineering Management Guide,
January 1990.
DeMarco, T., Controlling Software Projects, Yourdon Press, 1982.
Department of Defense Directive 5000. 1, Defense Acquisition, 23 February 1991.
Department of Defense Inspector General Audit Report, Acquisition of the V-22 Joint
Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey), no. 89-077, 14 June 1989.
Department of Defense Inspector General Audit Report, Review of the V-22 Aircraft
Program, no. 94-131, 14 June 1994.
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Defense Management Acquisition Procedures,
23 February 1991.
Department of Defense Manual 4245.7-M, Transition From Development to Produc-
tion.. .Solving the Risk Equation, September 1985.
Department of Defense Manual 5000.2-M, Defense Acquisition Management Documen-
tation and Reports, February 1991.
Department of Defense. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Acquiring
Defense Software Commercially. June 1994.
Department of Defense Software Development and Documentation. MIL-STD-498.
5 December 1994.
Department of Defense. Technical Report on Work Breakdown Structure Elements for
Software. 10 July 1992.
Department of Defense, U.S. National Strategy, 1993.
Department of Defense. Work Breakdown Structures for Defense Material Items.
MIL-STD-881B. 25 March 1993
Department of the Navy, NAVSO P-6071, Best Practices - How to Avoid Surprises in the
World's Most Complicated Technical Process... The Transition From Development to
Production, March 1986.
Department of the Navy, Program Executive Officer for Air Anti-submarine Warfare
(ASW), Assault, and Special Mission Programs, V-22 Avionics System Independent Risk
Assessment Final Report, Arlington, VA, 1 September 1994.
128
Department of the Navy, Program Executive Officer for Air ASW, Assault, and Special
Mission Programs, V-22 Full Scale Development, Digital Flight Control System Software
Product Assessment Final Report, Arlington, VA, 16 December 1994.
Ferrel, D.W., "Navy Airborne Weapon System Software Acquisition," Defense Systems
Management Review., vol. I, no. 6, pp. 47-53, Defense Systems Management College, Fort
Belvoir, VA, 1978.
Glennan, T.K., Bodilly, S.J , Camm, F , Mayer, K.R., and Webb, T.J , Barriers to
Managing Risk in Large Scale Weapon System Development Programs, The Rand
Corporation, 1994.
Holzer, R , "V-22 Earns Vital Go-ahead," Navy Times, vol. 43, no. 50, p. 36,
19 September 1994.
Integrated Program Summary, Annex D, Risk Assessment for the V-22 Program, 1994.
Johnston, J., "Commercial Techniques Trim Tiltrotor's Price Tag," National Defense, vol.
79, no 503, pp. 48-49, December 1994.
Jones, C, Assessment and Control ofSoftware Risks, Yourdon Press, 1994
Kitfield, J
,
"Is Software DOD's Achilles' Heel?," Military Forum, July 1989.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Ames Research Center, Final Report,
V-22 Flight Control System Software Development Assessment Team, Moffett Field, CA,
31 August 1993.
Naval Research Laboratory. The Mudd Report: A Case Study ofNavy Software Develop-
ment Practices. 21 May 1975.
Neumann, P.G., Computer Related Risks, ACM Press, 1995.
Office of Management and Budget, "Major System Acquisitions." OMB Circular No.
A-109 to the Heads ofExecutive Departments and Establishments 5 April 1976.
O'Brien, MA, The V-22 Osprey: A Case Analysis, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, CA, June 1992.
Operational Requirements Document for Joint Multi-mission Vertical Lift Aircraft
(JVMX), 4 April 1995.
129
Program Executive Plan for the V-22 Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Program, 1 6 July 1 993
.
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000. 2A, Implementation of Defense Acquisition
Management Policies, Procedures, Documentation, and Reports, 9 December 1992.
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000. 32A, Acquisition and Management Policies and
Proceduresfor Computer Resources, 3 May 1 993
.
Sedivy, D.G., Bureaucracies at War: The V-22 Osprey Program, Executive Research
Project F37, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University,
Fort McNair, Washington, DC, April 1992.
Software Development Plan for the V-22 Application System Software,
16 September 1994.
Software Engineering Institute Special Report CMU/SEI-94-SR-9, Carnegie Mellon
University, Software Acquisition: A Comparison ofDOD and Commercial Practices, by
Jack R. Ferguson and Michael E. DeRiso, October 1994.
Software Engineering Institute Technical Report CMU/SEI-90-TR-12, Carnegie Mellon
University, National Software Capacity: Near-Term Study, by J.A.L. Siegal, S. Stewman,
S. Konda, P.D Larkey, and W.G. Wagner, May 1990.
Software Engineering Institute Technical Report CMU/SEI-92-TR-30, Carnegie Mellon
University, Software Development Risk: Opportunity, Not Problem, by Roger L. Van
Scoy, September 1992.
Software Engineering Institute Technical Report CMU/SEI-93-TR-6, Carnegie Mellon
University, Taxonomy Based Risk Identification, by Marvin J Carr, Suresh L. Konda, Ira
Monarch, Carol Ulrich, and Clay F. Walker, June 1993.
Software Engineering Institute Technical Report CMU/SEI-94-TR- 1 9, Carnegie Mellon
University, Software Risk Evaluation Method Version 1.0, by Frank J Sisti and Sujoe
Joseph, December 1994.
Software Engineering Institute Technical Review '92, Carnegie Mellon University,
Software Development Risk Management: An SEI Appraisal, by Robert J Kirpatrick,
Julie A Walker, and Robert Firth, 1992.
Stormont, DP and Welgan, R., "Risk Management for the B-1B Computer Upgrade,"
IEEE Proceedings of the IEEE 1994 National Aerospace and Electronics Conference,
vol 2, pp 1 143-1 149, New York, NY, 1994.
130
Turn, R
, Davis, MR., and Reinstedt, R.N., A Management Approach to the Development
ofComputer Based Systems, The Rand Corporation, 1976.
United States Air Force. "Software Risk Abatement," Air Force Systems Command
Pamphlet 800-45, 30 September 1988.
United States Congress, The Status of the V-22 Tiltrotor Aircraft Program, Hearing
Before the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee and the Research and
Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, 5 August 1992.
United States General Accounting Office, Technical Risk Assessment; The Status of
Current DOD Efforts, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs,
United States Senate. April 1986.
United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-86-45S-7, DOD Acquisition,
Case Study of the Navy V-22 Osprey Joint Vertical Lift Aircraft Program, Report to
Congressional Requesters. July 1986.
United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-88-160, DOD Acquisition
Programs, Status of Selected Systems, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate. June 1988.
United States General Accounting Office, GAO/IMTEC-90-23, Meeting the Government's
Technology Challenge: Results ofGAO Symposium. February 1990.
United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-90-30, Defense Acquisition
Programs, Status of Selected Systems, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate. December 1989.
United States General Accounting Office, GAO/IMTEC-90-34, Embedded Computers,
Better Focus on This Technology Could Benefit Billion Dollar Weapons Programs.
Report to the Chairman, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, Committee on
Government Operations, House of Representatives. April 1990.
United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-91-45, Naval Aviation, The V-22
Osprey — Progress and Problems, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives. October 1990.
United States General Accounting Office, GAO/EV1TEC-92-48, Embedded Computer
Systems, Significant SoftH'are Problems on C-17 Must Be Addressed, Report to the
Chairman, Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, Committee on Government
Operations, House of Representatives. May 1992.
131
United States General Accounting Office, GAO/IMTEC-92-62BR, Embedded Computer
Systems, Defense Does Not Know How Much It Spends on Software, Briefing Report to
the Chairman, Subcommittee on Research and Development, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives July 1992.
United States General Accounting Office, GAO/IMTEC-93-13, Mission Critical Systems,
Defense Attempting to Address Major Challenges, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
on Research and Development, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
November 1992.
United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-93-15, Weapons Acquisition, A
Rare Opportunityfor Lasting Change, Report from the Comptroller General of the United
States. December 1992.
United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-94-44, Navy Aviation, V-22
Development — Schedule Extended, Performance Reduced, and Costs Increased, Report
to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. January 1994.
V-22 Program Document, Computer Resources Life Cycle Management Plan,
25 September 1995.




Defense Technical Information Center
8725 John J. Kingman Rd , STE 0944









Professor David V Lamm, Code SM/Lt
Department of Systems Management
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
Professor Martin J. McCaffrey, Code SM/Mf
Department of Systems Management
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
Professor Tarek Abdel-Hamid, Code SM/Ah





Defense Systems Management College
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-5426
LTC Jim Huskins
9820 Belvoir Road
Defense Systems Management College
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-5426
133
9. Mr. Fred Huber
Manager, Navy Programs
801 North Randolph Street, Suite 405
Arlington, Virginia 22203
1 0. Ms. Tara Potter Rumsey








12. Dr. Elaine Hall
Director, Risk Management & Metrics
Software Program Managers Network
P O Box 33445
Indialantic, Florida 32903-3445





14 5inps inn i|L
- th JiJi r r IS
1/99 22527-200 '-«




